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Identity Federalism in Europe

and the United States
Vlad Perju*
ABSTRACT

The turn to identity is reshapingfederalism. Opposition to
the policies of the Trump administration,from the travel ban to
sanctuary cities and the rollback of environmental protections,
has led progressives to explore more fluid and contingent forms
of state identity. Conservatives too have sought to shift federalism
away from the jurisdictionalfocus on limited and enumerated
powers and have argued for a revival of the political safeguards
of federalism, includingstate-basedidentities. This Article draws
on comparative law to study identity as a political safeguard of
federalism and its transformationfrom constitutional discourse
to

interpretative processes and, eventually,

constitutional

doctrine.
The experience of the European Union, where identity
federalism also benefits from a textual anchor, reveals some of the
complexities of this process. As an eminently vague concept,
identity leaves too much room for judicial discretionand leads to
unsolvable conflicts among courts as well as between courts and
other branches. Like the old sovereignty-based approaches,
identity encourages judges to draw bright lines, resurrects
jurisdictional conflicts, and discourages cooperation and
compromise. In the age of populism, identity federalism draws
courts into new and particularly concerning forms of
polarization.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A specter -is haunting federalism-the specter of identity.
Opposition to the policies of the Trump administration, from the travel
ban to sanctuary cities to the rollback of environmental protections,
has led progressives to rediscover the emancipatory virtues of
federalism and emboldened them to explore "more fluid and contingent
forms of state identity."1 The left's constitutional agenda overlaps with
the conservative strategy to shift away from a focus on jurisdictional
matters, seen as having failed to adequately protect state sovereignty, 2
and toward a revival of the political safeguards of federalism-

1.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1077, 1114
(2014) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism]. Bulman-Pozen also notes that
she does not "attempt to defend a notion of state identity as such but instead argues that
we may be missing a powerful form of identification with states because our
understanding of what constitutes political identity is too rigid." Id. at 1108-19.
2.
Ernest A. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us About the Future of American
Federalism?, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1113-16 (2017) [hereinafter Young, What Can
Europe Tell Us] (questioning the effectiveness of a strategy centered on the federal
center's "limited and enumerated powers"). See also Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member
State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American
Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1612, 1645-49 (2002).
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3
including, importantly, state-based identities. While dismissing the

4
idea that states have an identity as "pointless, indeed often silly" had
5
been a common trope during the rise "and rise" of the administrative

state in the twentieth century, today's political climate and
constitutional challenges indicate that, as Ernest Young has argued,
"reports of the death of state identity are greatly exaggerated." 6
The identity turn explains, at least in part, why some American

scholars have found that "the most interesting developments in
federalism are happening in Europe" and have looked for "European

structures and solutions [that] may offer some options that Americans

7
have previously failed to consider or appreciate." Over the past

decade, the European Union (EU) has upgraded its protections of
8
national constitutional identity, and its member states have started

operationalizing their own similar protections. In particular, both
national and supranational European courts have recognized identity

not only as a political safeguard of Europe's admittedly "sui generis
community in the process of progressive integration"9 but also, and

See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism:The Role of the
3.
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 544 (1954) (describing the importance of states' influence on national actions).
Recent restatements include Larry D. Kramer, Putting the PoliticsBack into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Two
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1355-56 (2001); see also Peter J.
Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 621 n.120 (1999) (making the
point that distinctive state-based identities are on the rise).
Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw,
4.
84 VA. L. REV. 389, 393 (1998).
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L.
5.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994). Already in the mid-1960s, Robert Dahl argued that "the states
do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government." Robert A.
Dahl, The City in the Futureof Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 968 (1967).
6.
Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness,
and Political Culture in the American Federal System 122 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Duke Law Scholarship Repository) [hereinafter Young, The
Volk of New Jersey?].
Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supra note 2, at 1110. The turn to identity
7.
is part of a larger lesson of European identifies the other lessons of as 1) The EU's
capacity to make decisions independent of the Member States is far more limited than
Congress's; 2) the EU has far less money to spend, and far less power to raise more, than
does the American federal government; and 3) the EU depends on Member States almost
completely to implement European law. Id. at 1116-17.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
8.
art. 4(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 4(2) ("The Union shall respect the equality of
the Member States as well as their national identities inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.").
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE
9.
37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I-BeschluB (1974). See also Bruno de Witte, The European
Union as International Legal Experiment, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Grainne de Bnrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds, Cambridge Univ. Press
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importantly,
as a doctrine that "[constitutionalizes]
national
identity"1 0 at both national and European levels." This highly
adaptable doctrine has been used both defensively, as a closure
mechanism that shields nation-states from deeper supranational
integration, as well as offensively as a sword against the authority of
the EU. 12 As Joseph Weiler perceptively put it more than a decade ago,
"[t]o protect national sovereignty is passe; to protect national identity
by insisting on constitutional specificity is A la mode."13 Developments
in recent years suggest that identity has become the new sovereignty.
While identity federalism remains at an early, exploratory stage
in American constitutionalism, the European experience has been
sufficiently robust to allow an initial assessment, at least in its original
context. Identity has fundamentally altered the tempo of constitutional
politics in the EU. Despite hopes that it could serve as a tool of fidelity
and principled compromise, the foregrounding of identity in
constitutional discourse and its hardening into doctrine have often led
to the escalation of long-simmering constitutional conflicts. Actors,

especially

judicial

actors,

that

had

been

previously

open

to

compromise, have become significantly more radicalized in the new
constitutional landscape. Identity has colonized the self-understanding

of the national constitutional orders and recast their relationship to
supranational institutions on a basis that is more structural (which

2012)

(arguing that the EU is sui generis); Andrew Moravcsik,

The European

Constitutional Settlement, in SOPHIE MEUNIER & KATHLEEN R. MCNAMARA, MAKING
HISTORY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY (2007) (arguing

that the European Union is not a federation).
10.
Pietro Faraguna, Constitutional Identity in the EU-A Shield or a Sword?, 18
GERMAN L.J. 1617, 1620 (2017).
11. While this Article studies the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, there have been signs that the concept of constitutional identity has
also started to impact the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
Although the court does not mention constitutional identity explicitly, scholars have seen
that concept implicitly at work in some of that court's prominent cases. See Federico
Fabbrini & Andras Saj6, The Dangers of ConstitutionalIdentity, 25 EUR. L.J. 457, 46162 (2019) (discussing implicit use of constitutional identity in supranational courts).
12. Id. at 1631 ("The concept [of constitutional identity] is no longer used as a
shield to protect national constitutional identities against further European integration,
but as a sword to fend off the authority of EU law over a Member State jurisdiction. This
trend may generate concern, especially when Member States take up illiberal concepts
of identity.").
13. J.H.H. Weiler, On the Power of the Word: Europe's Constitutional
Iconography, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 173, 184 (2005). See also NATIONAL CONSTITUTIoNAL
IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 3-8 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro

Llivina eds., 2013) (discussing the shift from sovereignty to identity). Interestingly,
Flaubert described the concept of constitutional identity as "national or nationalistic
delirium, dogmatic caprice of law professors, identity card of nation states, modern
variation of the idea of sovereignty." GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, DICTIONARY OF RECEIVED

IDEAS (1911) (mentioned in LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN, L'identit4 constitutionnelle
en question, in L'IDENTITE CONSTITUTIONNELLE SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 155
(2011)).
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institution has the authority to decide what identity is?) rather than
dialogical (what is the most inclusive or principled manner of making
such decisions?). Identity has also spread like fire across the legal
orders of the EU member states. From its original locus in Germany,14
16 the Czech
5
it has migrated to Spain,1 the United Kingdom,
9
8
Republic,' 7 Italy,1 Poland,1 and many other jurisdictions in between.

Identity has arguably become the most successful legal transplant in
20
the early twenty-first century. Unsurprisingly, identity has shaped

the legal disputes related to the crises that have recently befallen
Europe, from the Eurozone crisis (is Germany's constitutional identity
infringed when fiscal decisions, such as the decision to bail out Greece,
2
are made at the supranational level? 1) to the refugee crisis (is
Hungary's constitutional identity violated if a EU regulation requires
22
it to admit Muslim refugees through a quota system? ) and, more
recently, the rule-of-law crisis (is Romania's constitutional identity
encroached upon by the European Commission's anticorruption
Verification
and
Cooperation
the
through
recommendations

Mechanism?2 3 ).
The institutional corollary of identity federalism has been judicial
empowerment. Identity-national or constitutional-is an eminently
vague concept whose interpretation leaves much room for judicial
discretion. 24 The effect has been less a preoccupation with identifying
the best interpretation of identity than a structural concern with the
allocation of the authority to interpret its meaning. Thus, even while
courts have struggled substantively with the task of defining identity,

14.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 23,
1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGe] 14, 32, 50
(mentioning "identitatsbestimmende Staatsaufgaben"). See also infra Section III. A. 3.
See also Russell Miller, Germany's German Constitution, 57 VA. J. IN'L L. 95, 96 (2017)
(arguing that Germany's Basic Law is a specifically German constitution).
S.T.C., Declaration 1/2004 (Dec 13, 2004).
15.
R v. Sec'y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3 (appeal taken from Eng.).
16.
Ustavni soud Oeske republiky ze dne 03.05.2006 (Decision of the Czech
17.
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006), P1 US 66/04.
Corte Constituzionale (Corte Const.) (Constitutional Court), 24/2017
18.
(Tarrico).
Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010.
19.
20.
On the phenomenon of constitutional migrations, see generally Vlad Perju,
Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and Migrations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304-27 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds.,
2012).

21.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] Jan. 14,
2014, Order of the Second Senate of 14 Jan. 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13.
22. Alkotminybir6sag (AB) [Constitutional Court] 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB hatArozat
(Hung.).
23. Romanian Constitutional Court, Judgment nr. 104/2018 and Judgment nr.
137/2019.
See Fabbrini & Saj6, supranote 11, at 466-69 (identifying arbitrariness and
24.
indeterminacy as the "normative problems" of constitutional identity).
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they seem to have uniformly cherished their power to authoritatively
make such determinations. Judges have been adamant about
protecting their turf even when substantively they could do no better
than tie national constitutional identity to general values such as
"respect for fundamental principles of our constitutional order or the
inalienable human rights" 25 or "the essential attributes of a democratic
law-based state."2 6 Less benignly, in countries such as Hungary and
Poland, where constitutional courts have been captured by
authoritarian populists, 27 identity doctrines have played a critical role
in immunizing the authoritarian backsliding from both domestic and
European attempts to protect the rule of law. 28
It is, of course, true that many of these features of identity
federalism pertain to Europe's specific circumstances. Different
languages, histories, and legal traditions within Europe give national
constitutional identity a weight that states lack within the United
States, where nationalization has brought about greater political,
cultural, and social integration. There are greater objective differences
between Italy and Austria than, say, between Vermont and New
Hampshire. Empirical studies have shown that, for the most part,
citizens of EU member states see themselves less as Europeans first
than US citizens define their identity first as American and in
subsidiary as citizens of their respective states. 29 Finally, even if
identity were to play a similar role in the United States, as a political

25.
Federico Fabbrini & Oreste Pollicino, Constitutional identity in Italy:
European integration as the fulfilment of the Constitution 3 (Eur. Univ. Institute,
Working Paper No. 6, 2017) ("Italy epitomizes the case of a founding EU member state
where the supreme institutional actors have never systematically identified a core set of
fundamental elements or values functionally designed to protect the identity of the polity
against supranational interference").
26.
Ustavni soud Cesk6 republiky ze dne 03.05.2006 (Decision of the Czech
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006), P1 US 66/04, 1 82.
27.
See R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National
Authoritarianismin Europe's Democratic Union, 52 GOv'T & OPPOSITION 211, 227 (2017)
(describing how populist party won majority of seats in Polish parliament in 2015);
Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in
the EU, 19 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 3, 9 (2017) ("The cases of Hungary and
Poland, to mention only the EU examples of a broader international trend, suggest a new
worrying pattern in the fate of constitutional democracies").
28.
See Monica Claes & Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of National
ConstitutionalIdentity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the
Gauweiler, 16 GERMAN L.J. 917, 967 (2015) ("The comparative analysis thus reveals a
clear trend in the case law of national (constitutional) courts to announce constitutional
limitations regarding participation in European integration and to the effect of EU law
in the domestic legal order.").
29.

But see Ernest A. Young, A Comparative Perspective, in OXFORD PRINCIPLES

OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 142-88 (Robert Schiitze & Takis Tridimas eds.,
2018) (discussing identity in both the European and the American contexts an empirical
matter and suggesting that the alignment of emotional attachments is not as clear as
traditional scholars have assumed).
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safeguard or a constitutional doctrine, American federalism has a
vastly different toolkit and more settled structure, both discursive and
doctrinal, than the comparatively still-underdeveloped European
31
Europe
constitutionalism. 30 Over six decades after its beginnings,
("Staatenverbund")
states
national
sovereign
of
an
association
remains
whose member states, as Brexit is a constant reminder, retain the kind
32
of exit options that American states lack. EU member states continue
to oppose including a United States-style supremacy clause in the

Treaty of Lisbon, 33 despite the decade-long case law of the EU's apex
court, the Court of the Justice of the European Union (hereinafter
34
ECJ), holding that EU law has primacy over national law.
Mainstream European constitutional theory still conceptualizes
relations of authority within the EU as heterarchical, rather than

hierarchical, and refers to an ethos of constitutional tolerance through

See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and
30.
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 273 (2001) (describing the
difficulty of comparing constitutional structures: "First, federalism provisions of
constitutions are often peculiarly the product of political compromise in historically
situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than a principled
accommodation of competing interests. Each federal "bargain" is in important respects
unique to the parties' situations, in contrast to constitutional provisions asserted to
guarantee universal, or natural, or necessary rights of women and men as persons.
Similar phrases or provisions concerning federalism may have different historical
meanings in a particular polity, tied in different ways to the political compromises that
are usually at the foundation of a federal union. Second, not only are federal systems
agreed to as a compromise, but the compromise typically constitutes an interrelated
"package" of arrangements.").
See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407
31.
(1991) (describing the evolution of the EU toward an interstate structure with "a
constitutional charter and constitutional principles").
See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700 (1868) ("The Constitution, in all its
32.
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."); see also
Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism,supra note 1, at 1116-17 (discussing Texas' plan to
secede in the aftermath of President Obama's reelection, as well similar efforts in other
red states including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee). For a recent study of
secession in American federalism, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, NULLIFICATION AND
SECESSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016); see also Jens C. Dammann, Revoking
Brexit: Can Member States Rescind Their Declarationof Withdrawal from the European
Union?, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 265, 300-03 (2017) (analyzing Britain's exit from the
European Union).
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
33.
Union 2008 O.J. C 115/47, Declaration 17 [hereinafter TFEU], annexed to the Final Act
of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13
Dec. 2007 (annexation of a declaration to the Treaty of Lisbon); see also JEAN-CLAUDE
PRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 79-81 (2010) (analyzing

reasons for the member state opposition to formally enshrining supremacy into the
treaty).
See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that "the
34.
law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed,
without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of
the Community itself being called into question.").
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which respect for authority as "invited" rather than commended from
the top down. 35 All these features, it is argued, set the EU apart from
established federal. systems.
And yet, while acknowledging these differences, it would be
shortsighted to dismiss the relevance of Europe's experience with
identity federalism. 36 To start, the Trump era has upended many of the
formative compromises of American constitutionalism. 37 Second, the
political upheavals of the past decade have intensified the cultural
debates in which identity plays a central role. 38 Third, as the global
wave of populism has made apparent, American politics and law are
less insulated than many had thought or might have wished.39 Thus,

as the search for a new constitutional compromise gets underway, both
the left and the right could conceivably warm up to a recognizable
version of identity federalism. Should developments at the discursive
level gain sufficient traction, identity could become a concept used in
the process of constitutional interpretation. And from there to doctrinal
entrenchment there is only one step. The vortex that identity
federalism could bring about, in its final stage as constitutional
doctrine but also in its earlier, discursive and interpretative forms,
might sound promising for projects that aim to revisit the deep
structure of American constitutionalism. The pace at which identity
shifts the focus towards the constitutive units of a federative structure
may seem useful to the project of legitimizing sites of resistance to the
policies of the federal government.
But if such a path is at least imaginable, the EU's experience
becomes relevant, not least as a cautionary tale. Identity federalism
has further juridified the sphere of the political in Europe and turned

35.

Joseph Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional
&

Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 17 (J.H.H. Weiler

Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
36.
Such dismissal would rest on some general view of American exceptionalism,
which has recently been challenged. Recent studies of democratic decay are only the
latest to show that neither European nor American constitutionalism is as exceptional
as was traditionally believed. See Aziz HUQ & TOM GINSBURG, How TO SAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 4 (2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW

DEMOCRAcIEs DIE (2018).
37. See Jack Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the Cycles of
ConstitutionalTime, 94 IND. L.J. 253, 253 (2019) (discussing the polarization and current
mood of American politics).
38.
See, for instance, the debates surrounding MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND
FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITIcS (2017).

39.
The original debate regarding the use of foreign law in constitutional
interpretation centered almost exclusively on the migration of institutions and doctrines
that support constitutional liberalism. For a perceptive study of the migration of
mechanisms used to erode constitutional liberalism, see Kim Lane Scheppele,
Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying CrossConstitutionalInfluence through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003).
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40
conflict into turf wars from which courts are unwillingly to step away.
It is naive to hope that a turn to identity could orient American
4
federalism away from jurisdictional issues. 1 In reality, jurisdictional
issues return with a vengeance within a framework of identity
federalism. At play here is the old and familiar logic of sovereignty,
rather than a "fluid concept of identity, in which constitutional

assertions of self-definition are part of an ongoing process entailing
adaptation and adjustment as circumstances dictate." 42 Progressives,
in particular, should find this feature of identity particularly troubling.

While identity claims to be a versatile concept capable of supporting
the project of new "nationalism,"43 its doctrinalization risks reviving
an old age of American federalism. In that "Federalism 1.0," as Dean

Gerken calls it, 44 the state and federal government were understood as
separate spheres of authority whose structural conflicts, derived from
their inevitable clashes, could be dealt with in a formalist way that
avoided engagement with the underlying substantive issues. And, in

the age of populism, those substantive issues include but would
arguably be more encompassing even than racism, that original sin of
American federalism, 45 as they threaten to empower either specific
state jurisdictions or the national government-or both-to wreck

wholesale havoc on the rule of law.
Given the early stage of legal developments related to identity
federalism, any study has by necessity an exploratory dimension. This
Article does not aim to provide a definitive account of the forms and
claims of authority and sovereignty involved in these constitutional

The relation between political and legal spheres, and specifically the
40.
juridification of political controversies, have a long history. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 16 (1835); see also ROBERT KAGAN, ADvERSARIAL LEGALISM:

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw (2001) (both examples of recent studies that have challenged
the long-held assumption about American litigiousness, especially in comparison with
Europe. In that debate, Tocqueville's observation that "[t]here is hardly any political
question in the United States that sooner or later does not turn into a judicial question"
had reached status of common wisdom). But see generally DAVID ENGEL, THE MYTH OF
(2016); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE
THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011)

(documenting the centrality of law and litigation in the EU).
41. Id.
42. GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 13 (2010).
43.
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889, 1894 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism];
see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalismand Nationalism: Time for a Detente?, 59 ST.
LOUIS L. REv. 997, 997 (2015) (proposing a d6tente between traditional and new
nationalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Time for a Ddtente?].
44. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (2017)
(distinguishing three ages of American federalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism3.0];
see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-24 (3d ed. 2000).
See WILLIAM K. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155
45.

(1964) ("if ... one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism."), cited in
Gerken, Federalism3.0, supra note 44, at 1708.
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rearrangements. Its aim is rather to provide a preliminary map of
these developments, to identify the constitutive parts of national
constitutional identity, and to introduce and frame the general debates
surrounding identity federalism. Part I explores if identity takes shape
around similarity or difference, the choice of national versus
constitutional identity and, finally, the mandate of institutions such as
courts in defining identity. Part II introduces the state identity in
American experience, starting with the dismissal of the identitarian
framework post-New Deal and continuing through its recent revival.
Part III turns to the lessons from Europe. After placing identity in the
context of strategies of national resistance to supranational
integration, it studies the use of identity within the constitutional case
law of the EU member states, both as a self-standing tool as well in the
hands of authoritarian populist governments. In Part IV, this Article
draws on the lessons of this comparative analysis and discusses some
of the possible future(s) of identity federalism. This Article ends with
a brief conclusion.

II.

THEORIZING IDENTITY

The question of what constitutes identity has been called one of

"the hardest question[s] of constitutional law."46 This Part discusses
three aspects relevant to the subsequent analysis. Part II.A. takes up

the definition of identity, and specifically the issue of identity as a
matter of resistance or belonging. Part II.B. discusses the type of
identity-national or constitutional-relationship, and the factors
associated with each. Finally, Part II.C. turns to some of the
institutional implications and specifically the authority of courts in the
process of defining the meaning of identity.

A. Similarity versus Difference
The most common understanding of identity in a legal context
refers to the essential characteristics that set a jurisdiction apart from
all others and thus define its individuality.4 7 France is not Germany

46.
Mark Tushnet, How Do Constitutions Constitute ConstitutionalIdentity?, 8
INT'L J. CONST. L. 671 (2010). Somewhat more plastically, a Dutch historian once likened
the concept of identity to "a jellyfish on the beach - to be observed with interest, but not
to be touched." Barbara Oomen, Strengthening Constitutional Identity when there is
none: the case of the Netherlands, 77 REvUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D'ETUDES JURIDIQUES

235, 238 (2016).
47.
Gerhard van der Schyff, EU Member State Constitutional Identity, 76
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 3 (2016)
(defining "constitutional identity as "the individuality or essence of an order"); see also
Michel Troper, Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity in
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and Texas is not California. While each has much in common with the
other, they remain nevertheless different in ways that are relevant.
When a polity passes a certain threshold of cultural, social and political
homogeneity, it means that those distinctive elements are no longer in
place. Edward Rubin's views capture this well in the context of the
United States. Writing in 2001, he argued that
[a]t present, the United States is a socially homogenized and politically
With the minor exceptions of Utah and Hawaii, there is
centralized nation ...
Our political culture
no American state with a truly distinctive social profile ...
is more uniform still ... Most important, the primary political loyalty of the vast
48
majority of Americans is to the nation.

and
the impact of uniformity, homogenization,
Note here
centralization on the distinctive state identities. While Texas does not

become California, to return to my example above, the differences
between them are not greater than what federalism can accommodate.
That is because federalism already has built into it a certain breathing
space, or degree of respect, for value pluralism. As Mark Tushnet has
argued, "federalism has its attractions as a principle of government
almost entirely because it provides an almost unassailable base for
value-pluralism." 49

Difference and sameness are to some extent facets of the same
coin. Texas is similar to California, and thus both are different from
Mexico. Italy is similar to Austria, and both of them are different from

Morocco. If one looks at the formation of identity, one notices that the
two types of relations are not independent of each other. The forging of
a common identity has often required the existence of an outsider in
50
opposition to which one discovers, or constructs, one's own identity.
The Roman Empire held itself as different from the Germanic tribes in
central Europe, and Europe has always played the role of the "other"

for the United States.
The question of the "other" in the formation of identity becomes
more complex when identity is seen in a dynamic perspective, through
its formation or process of becoming. Anyone with a passing knowledge
of European history is familiar with the deep differences between
French and German national identities, and about how each identity

France, in ANDRAS SAJo & RENATA UITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY: VALUES AND

CONSTITUTIoNS 187-204 (2010).
Edward Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS
48.
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 37, 43 (2001).
49.
Mark Tushnet, Comment, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 873,
876 (1996), cited in Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, supranote 1, at 1121 (BulmanPozen also notes that "[f]ederalism renders diversity a defining structural feature of the
United States").
See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005);
50.
AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY (2006).
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formed itself in opposition to the other. 5 1 Has the process of European
integration altered this mode of identity formation? Here is the
affirmative answer of a constitutional court in another EU member
state: "[t]he idea of confirming one's national identity in solidarity with
other nations, and not against them, constitutes," in the words of the
Polish Constitutional Court, "the main axiological basis of the

European Union."5 2 This view, that the process of European identity
creates identity through solidarity, rather than through opposition,5 3
is connected to the view of European integration as a fundamental
commitment to diversity and toleration of the other, which requires
fundamental changes internal to the municipal jurisdictions. The
European constitutional architecture preserves the plurality of distinct
political identities, and political self-determination, as a "civilizing
strategy of dealing with the 'other.' 54 The nonhierarchical relations of
mutual accommodation or "constitutional tolerance." 5 5 By contrast to
traditional federative states, such as the United States, where the
center mandates obedience, the European supranational political
formation is voluntary in nature and, therefore, obedience is "invited."
Given the special historical conditions in which it developed,
"European constitutionalism is constructed with a top-to-bottom
hierarchy of norms, but with a bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and
real power." 56 The
outcome is harmonization,
rather than
homogenization, and is accordingly less violent. This process is best
understood as the political expression of the nonbinary conception of a
rich, layered identity. National and European identities can coexist so
long as they are not mutually exclusionary. 57

51.
See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE
AND GERMANY (1992).

JUSTICE: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND HUMANITIES 108 (Helle Porsdam

&

52.
Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010. See also Mattias Kumm, Why
Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 117, 120
(2008) ("the universality of an ideal does not make it formally inadequate as an ideal
central to the identity of a particular community").
53.
See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Thick ConstitutionalPatriotismand Its
Implications for the Role and Structure of European Legal History, in DIALOGUES ON
Thomas Elholm eds., 2012).
54. Weiler, supra note 35, at 20.
55. Id. at 17 (referring to the corollary of this principle of constitutional tolerance,
understood as the "normative hallmark of European federalism.").
56. Id. at 9.
57. See Armin von Bogdandy, The EuropeanLessons for InternationalDemocracy:
The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for InternationalOrganizations, 23 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 315, 322 (2012) (referring to the "dual structure of democratic legitimation" - an
"innovative concept of democracy"). The philosophical view that informs this conception
sees individuals as holders of sovereignty with a dual political identity: both as citizens
of their Member States and, concomitantly, as citizens of the to-be-created EU. See
Jurgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a
Constitutionalization of International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 335, 342-43 (2012)
("Article 1(1) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe refers to both subjects,
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to
attempts
at least
thus
constitutionalism
European
problematize the distinction between similarity and difference in the

conception of identity. Whether it is successful in that attempt
remains, at least at this stage, an open question. The next Parts will
argue that, in practice, identity has generally not been the tool once

envisaged for mutual accommodation and tolerance. Nor is it apparent
to what extent this model accurately captures the dynamics of
European integration. The recent crises that have befallen the EUfrom the Eurozone crisis to the refugee crisis to Brexit-have certainly
put pressure on the European model of social integration. The question
for now, however, is less evaluative and more technical: Does European
constitutionalism impact national identity directly, or is its impact
through the displacement, or modification, of national identity through
distinctively constitutional identity?

B. National versus ConstitutionalIdentity
It seems uncontroversial to posit that national identity encases a.
.

nation's historical, cultural, social, and political experience. But what 1
about its constitution? National identity could be seen as part of
constitutional identity, 58 or, conversely, constitutional identity can be
5 9 In another, and particularly influential t,
part of national identity.
view, constitutional identity is distinct from national identity. As

Michel Rosenfeld argues, "all constitutions depend on elaboration of a
constitutional identity that is distinct from national identity and from
and extra-constitutional
all other relevant pre-constitutional

the 'citizens' and the 'states' of Europe. Even though this constitution drawn up by a
convention in 2004 was never adopted, the Lisbon Treaty currently in effect supports the
thesis that sovereignty is 'shared' between citizens and states.") (citations omitted). See
also id. at 343 ("Citizens are involved on both sides within the higher-level political
community - directly in their role as Union citizens, and indirectly in their role as
citizens of the Member States."); see also Jurgen Habermas, Citizen and State Equality
in a SupranationalPolitical Community: Degressive Proportionalityand the Pouvoir
Constituant Mixte, J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 171 (2017). The difficulty has been to put the
two identities on equal par in a way that is at least prima facie sustainable. For if
sustainability is not secured, then theories of divided sovereignty do little other than
delay or obscure but certainly not overcome the binary choice between conflicting claims
to absolute supremacy. See Vlad Perju, Double Sovereignty in Europe? A Critique of
Habermas'sDefense of the Nation-State, 53 TEX. INT'L L.J. 49, 53 (2018); Vlad Perju, The
Asymmetries of Pouvoir Constituant Mixte, 25 EUR. L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
See Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and ConstitutionalIdentity Before and
58.
After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REv. 36, 42-44 (2010) (describing the intersection between
national and constitutional identity).
Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Criminal Proceedings Against Stefano
59.
Melloni, Case C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:600, 1 137 ("I would make it clear that the
position which I propose that the Court should adopt in the present case does not mean
that account is not to be taken of the national identity of the Member States, of which
constitutional identity certainly forms a part.").
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identities." 60 Successful constitutions, in this view, gain the kind of
political and social traction that in turn shapes a community's
collective identity.
As far as constitutional identity is concerned, the question is

where to locate the identity elements of constitutional identity. If one
focuses on the text, preambles seem like a good place to start. It is well
known that preambles usually include references to abstract values. 6 1
Their rhetorical effect can be quite powerful, and sometimes courts

have incorporated preambles

into the enforceable

parts of the

constitutional text. 62 The preamble to the U.S. Constitution is central
to Dean Chemerinsky's project for a progressive revival of American
constitutionalism. 63 Constitutions also mark identity through so-called
eternity clauses, that is, through provisions that the constitution itself
immunizes from future amendment. For example, the German Basic
Law lists the principle that Germany is a democracy and the protection
of the right to dignity as provisions that cannot be amended.64 This is
-not to imply that such provisions can never be changed, but that-

absent amendments to the ban itself-their changes would require the
adoption of another constitution. Put differently, these eternity
provisions encapsulate something so fundamental about the identity of
an entire constitutional order that the possibility of changing them
would alter that identity in ways that the constitutional drafters
thought impermissible. The fundamental distinction at play here, most
thoroughly theorized in the work of Carl Schmitt, is between
subconstitutional or ordinary constitutional amendments, which can
be undertaken by the people's representatives because they do not alter
the identity of a constitutional order, and amendments that do engage
that identity and must therefore require the approval of the people as

60.
MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT:
SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 10 (2010). See also Michel
Rosenfeld,

Constitutional

Identity,

in

OXFORD

HANDBOOK

OF

COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 758 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2013) (arguing that "it
is easily to conceive of the French or German nation without reference to a
constitution.").
61.
See, e.g., Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation,8 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 714, 714 (2011).
62.

See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 15-17 (2008) (in France,

the Constitutional Council incorporated the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution into the
block of constitutional provisions, or bloc de constitutionnalite).
63.
ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF THE
CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 53-60 (2018) (noting that the preamble

is "the obvious place to begin discerning the values of the Constitution" and that
"[unfortunately] . . . it has been largely ignored in Supreme Court decisions and in
scholarly writings.").
64.
See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (2010) (for
a general discussion of eternity clauses); Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of "Eternity
Clauses": The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 436 (2011).
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the ultimate sovereign. 65 This is a redline conception of identity, which
defines the limits of the relation between nation-states and
supranational institutions. This conception has resulted from the
66
"constitutionalization of national identity," which has been a gradual
process of "distancing the notion of national identity . . . [in Article 4(2)
Treaty on European Union] from cultural, historical or linguistic
67
criteria and turns to the content of domestic constitutional orders."

C. Courts versus Culture
the
context,
European
the
in
above
mentioned
As
creates
and
judges
empowers
identity
national
of
constitutionalization
an institutional imbalance. The same conclusion seems warranted
when looking at American constitutional law. George Fletcher has
argued that judges should turn to constitutional identity in hard cases
68
about basic issues of constitutional law. Instead of turning outward
toward overarching principles of political morality, "the acceptable way

to resolve the disputes and explain the results is to turn 'inward' and
reflect upon the legal culture in which the dispute is embedded. The
way to understand this subcategory of decisions is to interpret them as
69
expressions of the decision makers' constitutional identities." There
will, of course, be disagreement about the meaning of constitutional
identity. Such disagreement is to be expected since the concept of
70
identity itself is, in a Dworkian sense, an interpretative concept.

65.

CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,

Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928) ("The boundaries of the authority for constitutional
amendments result from the properly understood concept of constitutional change. The
authority to "amend the constitution," granted by constitutional legislation, means that
other constitutional provisions can substitute for individual or multiple ones. They may
do so, however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the
constitution as an entirety is preserved."). See also Monika Polzin, Constitutional
Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments and the Idea of Constituent Power: The
Development of the Doctrineof ConstitutionalIdentity in German ConstitutionalLaw, 14
INT'L J. CONST. L. 411, 411 (2016).
Faraguna, supra note 10, at 1620. See also Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of
66.
Democracy in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice, 62 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 271,
280 (2013) ("an essential component of the national identity of Member States, the
democratic arrangements provided for by national constitutions are not to be
undermined by EU law . . .. [F]or national constitutional courts, the EU's commitment
to respecting national democracies is an essential element without which European
integration would come to an immediate halt").
67. Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy:
Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417,
1422 (2011).
68. George Fletcher, ConstitutionalIdentity, 14 CARDOZo L. REV. 737, 737 (1992).
69. Id. at 737-40 (discussing from this perspective central cases such as Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
70. RONALD DWORKIN, Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political
Philosophy, in JUSTICE IN ROBES 140 (2006) (positing a distinction between natural
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Other scholars have argued that questions of identity should be

taken away from the courts and given to other institutional actors. 71
As shown in the next Parts of this Article, this is a particularly
important matter since judicial monopoly over constitutional identity
leads almost inevitably to judicial aggrandizement. The German
Constitutional Court, for instance, has held that "the protection of the

latter is a task of the Federal Constitutional Court alone."72 By
contrast, the French Constitutional Council has held that EU
legislation must not violate a rule or principle inherent in the
constitutional identity of France except when the constituent power
has consented to such reversal.73 To be sure, such consent can be given
directly by the constituent power or through the people's elected
representatives reunited in both houses of parliament. The French
Council has declined the power to review both when the authorization
is direct, 74 as well as when it is mediated. 75 These differences in
approach reflect deeper constitutional traditions in France and

Germany. 76
It is not too difficult to see how national identity can be taken
away from courts. But can constitutionalidentity be taken away from
courts? The starting point for an answer is to detach constitutional
identity from the constitutional text. As constitutions enter their life
cycle, the constitutional text becomes the basis of a dialogue between
the public officials, including courts, and the larger country. Robert
Post has argued that constitutional law "and culture are locked in a

dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law arises from and in
turn regulates culture." 7 7 This "dialogical engagement between the
core commitment(s) and its external environment," as Gary Jacobsohn

concepts that exist in the natural world and can be described through an accurate
assessment of the convention among speakers of the same language, and interpretative
concepts, such as law, equality, liberty or justice, that have no normative DNA and whose
meaning requires an exploration into what makes them valuable).
71.
See, e.g., Pietro Faraguna, Taking Constitutional Identities Away from the
Courts, 41 BRoOK. J. INT'L L. 491, 491 (2016).
72.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] Sept. 6,
2012, No. 2 BvR 2728/13, at ¶ 29.
73.
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 62-20DC,
Nov. 6, 1962 (Fr.) (declining to invalidate results of a referendum that President De
Gaulle had called on the question of the direct election of the French President in
apparent violation of the constitutional procedures for calling such referenda).
74.
Id.
75.
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2003-469DC,
Mar. 26, 2003, ¶ 2-3 (Fr.).
76.
See Jan-Herman Reestman, The Franco-German Constitutional Divide.
Reflections on National and Constitutional Identity, 5 Eu CoNsT. 374, 378 (2009)
(discussing French and German identity characteristics). See also Claes & Reestman,
supra note 28.
77.
Robert Post, Foreword:Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
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puts it in his study of constitutional identity, favors a "fluid concept of
identity, in which constitutional assertions of self definition are part of
an ongoing process entailing adaptation and adjustment as
circumstances dictate." 78 This dialectical conception of constitutional
identity means that disharmony "within and around the constitution
79
is key to understanding its identity." It is, of course, noteworthy that
this dialectical conception of identity, which results from the
interaction between formal institutions and background culture, was
theorized in the United States. Article V makes constitutional
amendments notoriously difficult to implement, especially under
conditions of deep political polarization, although, at least formally, no
8 0 It was
constitutional provision is eternal in the sense used above.
the politics of growing polarization that made the Constitution immune
from change, and in that particular sense eternal.

III. IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL SAFEGUARD: THE CASE OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM

Federalism may be "our Nation's own discovery," as Justice
Kennedy wrote, 81 but it was not until the federalism revolution of the
Rehnquist Court that core debates about the nature and role of state
sovereignty returned with a vengeance on the agenda of American
constitutionalism. 82 At least since the New. Deal, and arguably even
earlier, the idea that each state formed a "distinct society . . . [with its
83
own] distinct ethno-cultural identity" might have been a view of
historians but received little support in constitutional doctrine and was
derided by political scientists. In 1933, political science scholar Luther
Gulick argued that "[t]he American state is finished. I do not predict
84
that the states will go, but affirm that they have gone." As towering
a figure as Robert A. Dahl argued that "the states do not stand out as

JACOBSOHN, supra note 42, at 13.
78.
Id. at 15.
79.
80. Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability of the US Constitution and
the Democratic Component of Constitutionalism, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 575, 577 (2015)
(the US Constitution is amended less than other national constitutions and far less than
state constitutions). See generally YANIv ROZNAI, UNcONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS (2017); RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2019).

81.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

But see Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1698-1708 (arguing for
82.
jettisoning the mistaken assumptions of the New Deal that state and national power
should be conceived of in sovereignty-like terms).
83.
Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitutionalism,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 849, 861 (1999).
Luther Gulick, Reorganization of the State, 3 Civ. ENGINEERING 420, 421
84.
(1933), cited in Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 122.
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important institutions of democratic self-government." 85 To be sure,

federalism calls for the existence of a dual level of government to which
citizens owe their loyalties.86 James Madison saw divided loyalties as
giving federalism the vitality and guiding principles to protect political
freedom. 87 That insight was not lost on contemporary political
theorists. 88 The difficulty, however, was to find how that political
concept informed a constitutional approach that, for much of the
twentieth century, had consistently interpreted Congress's commerce

powers very broadly.
- The Rehnquist Court's federalism revival changed that.8 9 In a
string of cases that have redefined the arc of American federalism, the
Supreme Court struck down federal legislation-from the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 198590 to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 199091 and the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 92-as
encroaching upon the powers and rights that the

Constitution allocates to states. This development was perceived,
understandably, as a vindication of the states but also of the federal
system. 93 As the

Supreme

Court put it, the federal and state

85.
Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
953, 968 (1967). See also Antoni Abati Ninet & James A. Gardner, Distinctive Identity
Claims in FederalSystems: JudicialPolicingof Subnational Variance, 14 INT'L J. CONST.
L. 378, 396 (2016) ("In the United States, distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious
groups tend to be geographically dispersed, and even where they are concentrated, as in
urban areas, they tend not to comprise majorities capable of exercising political control
at the regional level. That dispersion, combined with a longstanding national project of
assimilation, has tended to undermine the conditions necessary for ethnocultural
distinctiveness to evolve into the kind of substate nationalism sometimes encountered
elsewhere. As a result, American states today rarely assert any kind of distinct identity
or sovereignty.").
86.
See RIKER, supranote 45, at 136 ("[F]ederalism is maintained by the existence
of dual citizen loyalties to the two levels of government.").
87.
THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 48-51 (James Madison).
88.
See, e.g., Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of
Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 465 (2007) (observing that, for the Federalists,
"[l]oyalty to the states ...
[was] the general protection against the new constitutional
order going awry").
89.
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
90.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (striking down
certain provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 on the ground that they improperly "commandeered" state legislative processes).
91.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (striking down the
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the ground that it fell outside Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause).
92.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (holding that parts of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional as they were not included
in Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution).
93.
See Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that the
Framers' idea that the competition for loyalty between the national government and the
States requires that "neither side totally win this competition").
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94
governments will act as mutual restraints "only if both are credible."
Defending the credibility of the federal government was not a
particularly onerous task, in light of decades of judicial deference to
Congress. But establishing the credibility of states required both
resolve and imagination. Any such account would need more than just
an abstract restatement of state sovereignty. It would need an
argument about commitment and, possibly, state identity. As John O.

McGinnis

has

argued,

successful

federalism

requires

"citizens'

95
Are citizens emotionally
emotional attachments to their states."

attached to their states?
A. Identity and Politics
The dominant answer among scholars has been a resounding no.
Malcom Feeley and Edward Rubin pointed out that "the American
people . . . have a unified political identity. Not only do they identify
themselves primarily as Americans, but they insist on normative
96
Similarly, James A. Gardner.
uniformity throughout the nation."
remarked that there is "a general absence of public identification with_
97
and Robert Schapiro referred to
the polity defined by the state,"
98
debates about state character as "pointless, indeed often silly."
If this position sounds uncompromising, it is important to=
understand it correctly in its narrow focus. While there are obvious
differences between states, these differences might not be of the kind
that translate into different identities. They are, for example, economic
differences, rather than differences rooted in historical or cultural
distinctions. 99 Conversely, it might be possible, and it is indeed likely,
that people form the kind of attachments that are constitutive ofr
identity at subnational but not state levels. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen
argues, "although the United States is not a homogenous polity,
00
This
American heterogeneity does not closely track state borders."1

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
94.
John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
95.
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 526 (2002) (arguing that
successful federalism requires "citizens' emotional attachments to their states.").
96.

MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM 115 (2008). See also

Jacob T. Levy, Federalism and the New and Old Liberalisms, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 306,
316 (2007) ("[L]oyalty to states ... has dwindled to almost nothing in most parts of the
United States").
James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourseof State Constitutionalism,90 MICH.
97.
L. REV. 761, 830 (1992).
Schapiro, supranote 4, at 393.
98.
Rubin, supra note 48, at 43 ("At present, the United States is a socially
99.
homogenized and politically centralized nation. Regional differences between different
parts of the nation are minimal, and those that exist are based on inevitable economic
variations, rather than any historical or cultural distinctions.").
100. Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism,supra note 1, at 1110.
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might have to do with the social and geographic mobility that leads to
"regional rather than state distinctiveness." 101 This distinctiveness
could also develop at lower levels of government, around cities 10 2 and
counties.103
Severing the link between emotional attachment and political
loyalty to states has far-reaching implications for American federalism.
At the level of constitutional doctrine, it suggests, as Robert Schapiro
has argued, that "the Supreme Court need not protect enclaves of state
policy autonomy because such autonomy would be meaningful only if
it reflected distinctive state political communities-which no longer
exist." 104 That observation is even more radical at the level of
constitutional theory. If federalism requires dual attachment, and if in
the American context, attachment to state government lacks, that
seems to put into question the very nature of the state. Federalism may
have been our "national neurosis,"1 05 but is that still the correct label
for the United States? The implications of no longer seeing the United
States as a federation, but, in one view, a centralized administrative
state, 106 are of course momentous. These consequences register not

only at the level of citizen attachment, as important as those may be,1 07
but also systemically through how the erosion of popular attachment
dilutes the loyalty of public officials.1 08 The political safeguards of
federalism depend on the national effect of how state officials exercise
their public duties.1 09 The concern is that the dilution of citizen

101. Id. at 1110-11 (arguing that "half of Americans age twenty-five and older do
not live in their state of birth, and more than a quarter of American adults have lived in
three or more states. To the extent the states reflect cultural differences, regional rather
than state distinctiveness is likely to be what matters.").
102, Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 106-10 (discussing
attachments to cities).
103. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term - Foreword:
FederalismAll the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2010) (discussing federalism at
the local level) [hereinafter Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term]; see also David
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377 (2001)
(discussing the tensions between different sites of government).
104. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009).

105.
Neurosis,
106.
107.

Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903 (1994).
Id.
Sidney Verba, Comparative Political Culture, in SIDNEY VERBA & LUCIAN

PYE, POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 512 (1965) ("[i]t is the sense of

identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it
possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers.").
108. H.L.A. Hart argued that the authority of law is established when state
officials take the internal standpoint and see themselves as bound to follow it. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 111 (1962) (connecting the existence of a legal system with
state officials acceptance of its binding authority).
109. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the SafeguardsBack into the PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 955-56 (2001) (describing threats to federalism and
the response of state officials); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
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loyalties sooner or later does have an effect in how officials discharge
their duties.
The impact on

American federalism

of a lack of citizens'

attachment to their states explains partly the reluctance to fully
embrace this line of reasoning. Another, and arguably weightier,
reason has to do with the constitutional text and the existing
constitutional structure. At that level, the issue is one of reconciling
the lack of state identity with the existing institutional framework.
Some of the most innovative works in American federalism over the

past few decades have sought to answer that challenge. Robert
Schapiro, for example, has argued for a "polyphonic federalism" that
protects a plurality of sources of authority and facilitates their

interaction.1 1 0 Since states are evidently one of these centers of
authority, he has concluded that the Constitution should protect their.
"institutional integrity and ...

political apparatus."

1

the continued functioning of each state's

Implicit in this position is a realignment of the

idea of state identity with a different set of attachments. Without

denying the reality of political polarization,

increased

cultural

2
homogenization sets off a search for other-"civic identities"1 -tc:
ground citizens' attachments. These identities would be looser, mores
flexible, and indeed contingent but could nevertheless work as thei
functional equivalent of unavailable, and perhaps undesirable, deeper..
forms of state attachments of the kind no longer available in the
3
American republic."
These new forms of identity would be "critical political
commitments."" 4 Such commitments could, of course, be interpreted
from the normative prism as different and localized interpretations of
1
But these forms of political
values that the entire nation shares.
attachments can be both thinner and equally consequential for the,

Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-58 (1954) (identifying several safeguards of
federalism dependant upon actions of state officials).
110. SCHAPIRo, supra note 104, at 92.
111. Id. at 96.
112. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2221 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, Federalism].
113. See Daniel Rodriguez, State ConstitutionalFailure, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1243,
1260 (2011) (common agendas and objectives tie together citizens of a state).
114. See Ernest Young, What Does It Take to Make a Federal System? On
ConstitutionalEntrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831, 843
(2011) (arguing that state identity can rest on "critical political commitments").
115. See Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1147, 1166 (1993) (highlighting the similarities
between disparate states). In this sense, the states would offer different conceptions of
the unifying national concepts. For the distinction between concept and conception, see
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1998).
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overall constitutional structure. 116 In an earlier piece that anticipated
subsequent developments, Vicki Jackson argued that using thick
identities as the only acceptance grounding citizens' state loyalty, and
consequently dismissing federalism on that basis, "ignores the degree
to which the political structures of state and local governments provide
organizing points for the development and maintenance of political
opposition to the national government." 117 The most representative
recent work in this direction is Jessica Bulman-Pozen's, who
disconnects state identity from cultural attachment but connects it
with ideological partisanship, whose effects run sufficiently deep as to
enter the territory of identity.11 8 Specifically, Bulman-Pozen argues
that "our sense of what it means to be an American, our national
identity, is mediated by partisanship,"1 9 citing further the work of
social psychologists that "Red and Blue have become distinct ways of
being "'American."1 20 Using "more fluid and contingent forms of state
identity," she finds that "partisanship emerges as a key variable, a
reason for individuals to channel loyalty and affiliation toward states
rather than toward the nation alone."121
B. The ConservativeRevival
Recent work, from both conservative and progressive quarters,
has started to shift the focus back on state identity. In a recent paper,
Ernest Young sought to offer the first comprehensive assessment of the
distinctiveness of American states from one another and explore the
attachments of American citizens to their states.1 22 Young probes the
empirical claim that the latter are lacking and finds evidence of "the

states' geographic, demographic, and policy diversity, states' impact on
political preferences, relative trust in state and federal institutions,
state's distinct historical narratives, and the impact of individual
mobility among the states." 123 His conclusion, that reports of the death
of state identity are greatly exaggerated, is particularly important in

116. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 769 (1995) ("[N]ationwide
crosscutting cleavages make American federalism stable because they give it a
Madisonian plurality of interest groups, no one of which is likely to terrorize the others
on a permanent basis.").
117. Jackson, Federalism,supra note 112, at 2218 n.177.
118. Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, supra note 1, at 1114.
119. Id.
120. Abraham M. Rutchick & Collette P. Eccleston, Ironic Effects of Invoking
Common Ingroup Identity, 32 BASIc & APPLIED SOc. PSYCHOL. 109, 111 (2010), cited in
Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, supra note 1, at 1114.
121. Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism,supra note 1, at 1108-9.
122. Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6.
123. Id. at i.
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24
It was a
the larger context of Young's analysis of federalism.1
mistake, he argues by looking at the European experience, to channel

the interpretative resources of American federalism toward the scope
125
From the early Republic through the
of regulatory jurisdiction.
Lochner-era and even during the Rehnquist federalist revival, there
had never been consistent or particularly effective constitutional
constraints on the scope of congressional regulation and thus on the
126
The reference to Europe is
powers of the national government.
important in this context because, as later shown in this Article,
European federalism recognizes relatively broad jurisdiction for the
central, or supranational, institutions without, however, making
federalism any less meaningful. The explanation, in Young's view, is a
system of representation in supranational institutions that limits the
EU's capacity to make decisions independently of its member states,
limits the financial resources available to the supranational
authorities,12 7 and puts member states in charge of implementing
European law, subject to some degree of supranational oversight.

These are structural safeguards whose implementation follows the.
logic of political engagement. That political-pragmatic "would" should
be the focus of federalism studies rather than the jurisdictional "could"
that assumes the national government will go as far as its formal legal
powers will allow it.128
It is in this larger context that, Young argues, scholars of
29
His
American federalism should turn their attention to identity.1
30
Many Europeans
discussion follows the question of identification.1
consider themselves Italian, Spaniards, or Poles first, and only after
that Europeans.131 By contrast, it is assumed that Americans think of
themselves first as such only in subsidiary, and not consistently, as
32
Vermonters, Californians, or North Carolinians.1 But, Young argues,
33
the reality might be more complex.1 There is evidence of polarization
and fragmentation across the American political landscape, which

124. See id. at 123.
125. See id. at 25.
126. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supranote 2, at 1121.
127. Id. at 1118 (arguing that "EU revenue comes predominantly from three
sources: duties on imports, collected by the Member States and transferred to the EU; a
share of the value-added tax collected by the Member States; and a levy on the gross
national income of each Member State capped at slightly under 1.3 percent.").
128. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177
YALE L.J. 408 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1057 (2015).
129. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supra note 2.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1124.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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impacts issues of state identity. 134 Moreover, issues of identity are not
preinstitutional, but. rather the outcome of institutional structures. 135
Put differently, it is remarkable that citizens' attachment to their

states has survived in any degree the homogenization under an
institutional structure that "one nation" doctrines of federalism have
imposed as orthodoxy throughout the twentieth century.136 But when
that institutional framework is loosened, and more authority is
recognized to states, the degree of citizens' attachment to their states
will grow deeper. 13 7 The political energy that such attachment would
unleash is, in Young's view, part of the universe of political possibility
and doctrinal opportunity that renewed attention to the question of

state identity can bring to the fore. 138
C. The ProgressiveRevival

The rediscovery of states is not exclusively a conservative project.
Past are the days of civil-rights federalism when the project of political
emancipation went hand in hand with a defense of central authority. 139

Under today's version of Federalism 3.0, as Gerken calls it, the
boundaries between state and federal has become much more porous

and the interplay between the two levels of government reflects the
complexity of the regulatory and discursive realities of contemporary
society. 140 Under this new logic, devolution to states does not promote

state-centered ends and centralization promotes nationalist ones, as
the sovereign-centered, old interpretation of federalism assumed.
Rather than sites where "groups can shield themselves from national

policy, national politics, or national norms," states are "the sites where
we battle over-and forge-national policy, national politics, and

134. See id.
135. See id. at 1111 (arguing that scholars need to look to institutions for an
understanding of identity).
136. See id. at 1115-16 (describing the effects of federalism doctrines on legal
culture).
137. See id. at 1138-39 ("it is not hard to imagine ... a de-escalation by returning
some of these divisive issues to jurisdictions where they can be resolved").
138. Id. at 1124-25 ("The basic question whether Americans identify with their
states breaks down into a host of more specific issues, all of which deserve further
investigation. Do the states represent distinct political communities that meaningfully
affect political beliefs? To what extent do personal attachments to states affect political
behavior? And do attachments to states trade off with, or complement, loyalty to the
nation? Few American legal scholars have taken these questions seriously, but they go
to the basic sociological underpinnings of federalism. The European literature has long
had a much better handle on these questions and it is time Americans paid more
attention to them.").
139.

See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155

(1964) ("[I]f... one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.").
140. Gerken, Federalism3.0, supra note 44, at 1696.
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national norms."1 4 1 An entire school of nationalism in federalism
studies seeks to show how devolution can serve nationalist, rather than

state-centered, aims. 14 2 The implications are twofold. First, since
states return to the fore, the question of what underpins their appeal
and ultimate authority is also making a comeback. The answer need

not submit to the logic
conservative

of sovereignty, which, by contrast to

federalists,1 43

the

school

of progressive

federalism

considers to be passd.144 Some of the scholars in the later camp, such
14 5
Other
as Dean Gerken, shy away from the language of identity.
be
somewhat
to
proven
have
generation,
younger
the
from
scholars,
46
more comfortable with a fluid and contingent approach to identity.1
It is certainly too early to draw definitive conclusions as to whether
identity will be a normative medium for progressive federalism. Such

conclusions

must

await

the

political

challenges

that

await

progressivism in the Trump, and post-Trump, age.

Here, this Article comes upon the second implication of the
(re)turn to states. If states participate in the making of national policy

and norms, then one should expect to see them use both their political
47
And,
and legal powers to influence the landscape of federal law.1
indeed, as Jessica Bulman-Pozen has argued, states have been
involved in the separation of powers at the federal level by seeking "to.
defend federal legislative prerogatives against the federal executive

141. Id.
142. Id. at 1722-23 ("Neither the federal government nor the states preside over
their own empire; instead, they regulate shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space,
sometimes leaning on one another and sometimes deliberately jostling each other. So,
too, states are no longer enclaves that facilitate retreats from national norms. Instead,
they are the sites where those norms are forged. And while local and state structures
were once condemned solely as tools for blocking racial change, they also provide crucial
structures for seeking change."). See generally Gerken, Federalism as the New
Nationalism, supra note 43; Gerken, Time for a Detente?, supra note 43.
143. Young assumes that the federalism revival returns the focus on state
"sovereignty". See Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 2 (arguing that "ever
since the Rehnquist Court began reviving the notion of constitutional limitations on
national power in the early 1990s, American legal scholars have rejoined the age-old
debate on the relationship between national and state "sovereignty."). See also Timothy
Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 233-34 (2005) (discussing
ideologies of federalism).
144. See Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1698 (associating the idea that
states and the national government belong to different spheres of authority to pre-New
Deal Federalism 1.0).
145. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term, supra note 103, at 16-17 (qualifying
as "odd" the discussion whether Americans identify with their states).
146. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1108-9
(criticizing a rigid approach to understanding identity).
147. See Heather Gerken & Joshua Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User's
Guide,

DEMOCRACY

JOURNAL

(2017),

https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-guide/
[https://perma.cc/SR7P-CAZ9] (archived Dec. 3, 2019) (suggesting progressive federalism
as an avenue for shaping national policies).
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branch." 14 8 This is the key for interpreting recent litigation that states
introduced against the Trump administration. In the litigation to
enjoin the first travel ban,1 49 Washington, Minnesota, and Hawaii
argued that President Trump violated the Immigration and
Nationality Act, a federal statute, and that they-the states-were
defending federal statutes against the executive.1 50 These are not new
developments, and Professor Bulman-Pozen documents a similar
dynamic at work, although with different ideological alignments, in
litigation that states brought against the Obama and George W. Bush
administrations.151 However, given the ideological contours of the
Trump administration and the ever-deeper polarization of American
politics, it is possible that the new wave of litigation will take these
litigation efforts to another level. And, at that level, the authority of
states might call for foundations of the kind that the argument from
identity can provide. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the role that

the federal Constitution would play in the state identity. If advocates
of Federalism 3.0 are correct, and states are sites of national norm
making, interpreting, and implementing, then state identity might
bypass the federal government to form a direct, Protestant
interpretation of the national commitments.1 5 2
Because the (re)turn to states spans the ideological spectrum, one
should not believe that the move is postideological. Instead, the path
to the return is deeply steeped in political ideology on both the left and
the right. It is just that both sides calculate what they stand to gain
from using this rhetoric. One need not wait for time to tell which side,
if any, is correct and who, if any, is miscalculating constitutional

148. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 488 (2012) (showing that state administration of federal
law affects the relative power of the executive and Congress).
149. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order. No.
13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept.
24, 2017).
150. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, FederalismAll the Way Up: State Standing and 'The
New Process Federalism", 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1741, nn.7-9 (2017). Similarly, in
litigation over stripping funding from "sanctuary cities", San Francisco argued that "[i]n
directing that sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible to receive federal funds, the
Executive Order asserts legislative power that the Constitution vests exclusively in
Congress." Id. at 1741 nn.10-12.
151. Id. at 1742 (documenting suits brought by states seeking to invalidate, under
the Take Care Clause, the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents program ("DAPA"), and against the Obama Administration's
Clean Power Plan, as well as states challenging the EPA's failure under the George W.
Bush Administration to regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to congressional
authorization (Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
152.

See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-51 (1988) (distinguishing

between Catholic constitutional interpretation, which requires the mediation of an
authoritative interpreter such as the Supreme Court, and Protestant constitutional
interpretation, where each subject can interpret the Constitution directly).
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strategy. It is possible to turn to Europe, and with all due caution, learn
from its own ongoing experiment with national identity.

IV. IDENTITY AS DOCTRINE: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISM

The move from political safeguard to constitutional doctrine gives
identity a transformative effect on the institutional architecture and
the discourse of federalism. In the European experience, identity has

shown itself as a versatile, flexible and, under certain political
circumstances, an effective means to undercut federal centralization.
It has arguably played a role in the self-understanding of European's
constitutional project as one informed by a certain set of values. It has
also undoubtedly played a role in the national resistance to the
constitutional and political project of European unification. First, this
Part places the role of identity in the arc of European federalism.

Secondly, this Part studies developments in the last decade after the
constitutionalization of identity.
A. The Origins of Identity
It is helpful to start by providing the specific historical and
jurisprudential contexts in which the function and significance of
identity must be understood. Supranational centralization is an

essential element of those contexts. Subpart A.1. presents the
radicalism of the claims that European constitutionalism, through the
doctrines of the Court of Justice, made on the legal orders of the
member states. Subpart A.2. discusses the resistance of national legal
orders to the supranational claims. While that resistance was initially
far less significant than mainstream constitutional theory now sees it,
it nevertheless provides the proper context for the arrival of identity
on the postwar European legal scene. Subpart A.3. presents that
arrival in the German legal system, which initially tied resistance to
European federalism to a duty to protect human rights as part of the
German constitutional identity. After human rights turned out to be
too shaky a ground on which to rest that resistance, German
constitutionalism brought out the big guns: at first, democracy in the
Maastrichtdecision and, finally, identity in its pure form in the Lisbon

decision.
1. The Structure of European Federalism
The nature of the EU is often labeled as sui generis, which puts

the EU in a category of its own-something less than a state but more
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than an international organization. 153 This conclusion has less to do
with the nature of the claims that European constitutionalism imposes
on the legal orders of the member states, which suggests a hierarchical
structure by and large typical of federations, than it is a statement of
the overall success or political traction of those claims. The first step is

to take stock of the claims themselves, made over the course of more
than six decades by the Court of Justice of the European Union on

behalf of the EU constitutive treaties. This Article presents the core of
the process of "constitutionalization,"1 54 and thus centralization, of the
Treaty of Rome, as a package sufficiently weighty to explain why Pierre
Pescatore characterized the process of European legal integration as
one that "undermines categories of thought which have been settled for
centuries, overturns deeply-rooted political ideologies and strikes at
powerfully organized interests." 155
The ECJ interpreted the treaty to create a legal order distinct-or
"autonomous,"1 56 in the court's language-from both domestic and
international legal orders. By marked contrast to international law,

the effect of the legal norms of this supranational legal order would be
consistent across the national jurisdictions and subject to the ECJ's
interpretative authority. European norms of any rank-treaty or
legislation-would by themselves be capable of conferring individual
rights enforceable in national courts. Should conflicts arise between

&

153. See, e.g., William Phelan, What Is Sui Generis About the European Union?
Costly International Cooperationin a Self-Contained Regime, 14 INT'L STUD. REV. 367,
371 (2012).
154. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of the Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (1981) (arguing that a constitutionalist framework
explains the early decisions interpreting the Treaty of Rome); Joseph Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2425-26 (1991) (describing the
constitutional interpretations of the Treaty of Rome). For evaluation, see Morten
Rasmussen, Revolutionizing EU Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment, 12
INT'L J CONST. L. 136, 140 (2014) (calling the constitutionalization of the Treaty a
"decisive turning point in the history of the European Court of Justice and of EU law in
general"). For a recent critique of the process of constitutionalization, see Peter Lindseth,
The Perils of As-If Constitutionalism, 22 EUR. L.J. 696 (2018); Morten Rasmussen
Dorte Martinsen, EU ConstitutionalizationRevisited: Redressing a CentralAssumption
in EuropeanStudies, 25 EUR. L.J. 251 (2019). For a study of EU constitutionalization in
the history of ideas, see Daniel Halberstam, Joseph Weiler, Eric Stein, and the
Transformation of ConstitutionalLaw, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE: TWENTY-

FIVE YEARs ON 219 (Miguel Maduro & Marlene Wind eds., 2017).
155.

PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION 4 (Christopher Dwyer trans.,

1974). In the same spirit, Walter Hallstein, jurist and president of the European
Commission, wrote in 1962 that the decisions of the European Court of Justice
represented the "apex of the Community so far." He deemed "the importance of the legal
developments" as "the greatest thus far." WALTER HALLSTEIN, UNITED EUROPE 35, 37
(1962).
156. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
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57
As a
European and domestic norms, the former would prevail.1
jurisdictional implication of this priority rule, national judges, acting
5 8 could "set
in their superseding authority as European courts,1
59
or disapply conflicting domestic norms even when-as was
aside"1
virtually always the case-they lacked such authority under their
national constitutions. 160 Conversely, only the ECJ could invalidate

European legislation. 161 Complex doctrines were built on these
foundations, including jurisdictional rules regarding the obligation of

national judges to refer questions up to the ECJ to the availability of
effective national remedies for violations of EU law, the duty to make
interim relief available, and the duty to guarantee the integrity of the

EU process by raising sua sponte questions of European law.1 62 Later,
the ECJ would accept the corollary of this approach-that member
states can be held liable in tort under EU law for failure to send
63
preliminary references to Luxembourg.
In one of its early foundational statements, the ECJ held that "[b]y
contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC treaty, has

created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty,,
became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states andy
64
which their courts are bound to apply."1 It has long been a matter of..
controversy how to understand the normative interface between the.
national and the supranational legal orders. In one view, European"
65
integration is best understood as a form of complex coordination.1
Each legal order-national and supranational-exists alongside one

another in heterarchical relations that European constitutional theory

157. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 599-600
(holding that certain Articles in the EEC Treaty do create individual rights which
domestic courts are obligated to protect).
158. Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R 11-309, 11-364, ¶
42 ("[W]hen applying [Community law], the national courts are acting as Community
courts of general jurisdiction.").
159. Case 106/77, Italian Minister of Finance v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629, 638.
160. Judicial review in many European legal systems is centralized, in the sense
that only one constitutional court can review constitutional challenges to the validity of
legislation. See generally VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND
DEMOCRATIC VALUES (2009).
161. Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost [1987] E.C.R. 4199.
162. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. I-2433, I-2473-74, ¶J 20-23 (explaining the duty to address
issues of international law which are implicated).
163. Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10239, 1-10331. For a fuller
description of these doctrinal developments, see Vlad Perju, On the (De-)Fragmentation
of Statehood in Europe: Reflections on Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde's Work on European
Integration, 19 GERMAN L.J. 403, 411 (2018).
164. Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
165. See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993)
(arguing that "the European Communities ... constitute a legal order co-ordinate with
that of the Member States.").

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

236

[VOL. 53:207

has spent decades trying to theorize. 6 6 An alternative view sees
European integration as a form of unification or fusion which, for all

the complexity of the resulting legal order, nevertheless meets the
criteria of vertical, hierarchical integration. Coordination is not
excluded from this latter model but by itself it does not capture the
originality and radicalism of European constitutionalism.
The radicalism of European constitutionalism stems from the

closer alignment of the ECJ with the fusion or unification model of
European integration. A compelling argument to that effect goes
beyond the aim of this Article. It suffices for the present purpose to
point to the core doctrines of autonomy and supremacy, which, in the
court's jurisprudence, form the unitary foundations of European

constitutionalism. Autonomy entails that courts may not tie the effect
of European norms within their jurisdictions to municipal rules,
including rules of constitutional rank, that determine the domestic
effect of international legal norms. Irrespective of whether national

legal orders are monist or dualist in regard to how the domestic legal
orders relate to international law, the imperatives of systemic unity
demand the centralization of decisions regarding the effect of EU
norms to the supranational level. And once the decision to centralize is
interpreted as deriving from the treaty itself, which is a source of law

independent of the decisions of its signatories or of their legal order,
the autonomy of the European legal order becomes immunized and
secure.
The consolidation of the authority of European law has been a long
process and remains ongoing. An important part of that process has

been a defense of its legality, that is, of the claim to autonomy of the
European legal order qua legal order. This explains, for instance, the
recurrent
and tantalizingly
tautological
deployment
of the
effectiveness rationale in the formative decisions of European
constitutionalism.1 6 7 Since effectiveness is a necessary, albeit hardly

sufficient, condition of legality, concerns

about the former are

understandably heightened in legal orders that are at early stages of
development. In the specifically European supranational context,
effectiveness is a function of the uniformity of interpretation and
implementation across domestic jurisdictions. The core idea is that the

legal effect of European legal norms cannot depend on the different
traditions and structures of municipal jurisdictions, or even more

166.

KLEMEN JAKLI6, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EU 3 (2013) (describing

constitutional pluralism as the dominant branch of European constitutional theory).
167. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594 ("[T]he law stemming from the treaty, an
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being
called into question.").
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16 8
Centralization thus
questionably, on the political interests du jour.

reflects the constitutional demands of a political project not guided by
"the laws of expediency [but one that] should be built upon a more
169
permanent and objective foundation."

2. Reciprocal Supremacy

The supremacy doctrine is central to the constitutional project of
supranational centralization. Supremacy, according to the ECJ, is the
normative implication of the autonomy of the European legal order. 170
From the "praetorian"171 holding in Costa regarding, to the absolute

that "[t]he obligations undertaken under the treaty
168. The ECJ held
establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they
could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories." Id. But, as
far as international law is concerned, the issue has its own complexities. The Permanent
Court of International Justice had held that municipal norms, including norms of
constitutional rank, could not be invoked to bar or otherwise limit that effect of
international law. Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 11 (May 16). Expanding on this analysis, Derrick Wyatt argued a few decades ago
that much of what the ECJ sought out to do in Van Gend could already be accomplished
under international law. Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147, It
148 (1982); see also Bruno de Witte, Retour h "Costa": La primaute du droit
communautaire a la lumiere du droit international, 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
EUROPEEN 425 (1984).
169. ANDRE M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 59

(1968). This is not to deny that, conceptually speaking, coordination rationale can be
sufficient to explain supranational centralization. In the case of European legal
integration, such an account would envisage successive spill-over processes set and kept
in motion by the need for ever more perfect coordination between municipal jurisdictions.
But, as Donner suggests, that process would not rest on "permanent and objective
foundation." Id. Even aside from close association between the logic of coordination and
international law, one insuperable difficulty of understanding integration as an everperfectible process of coordination is that, by itself such a process is aimless. What gives
it direction is an understanding of its purpose, be that pacification, prosperity and/or the
full axiological panoply of collective self-government: equality, liberty, and solidarity. For
a study, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Ought of Justice, in EUROPE'S JUSTICE DEFICIT
(Dimitry Kochenov et al. eds., 2015); Pierre Pescatore, L'objectif de la Communautd
Europdenecomme principes d'interpretationdans lajurisprudencede la Cour de Justice,
in MISCELLANEA W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 325-63 (2d ed. 1972).

170. Once the Luxembourg judges settled the difficult question of autonomy of the
autonomy of the European legal order, and did so specifically on the grounds laid out in
Van Gend, the extension to supremacy of European over municipal norms is a small
conceptual, albeit not political, step. See Editorial, For History's Sake: On Costa v.
ENEL, Andre Donner and the Eternal Secret of the Court of Justice's Deliberations, 10
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 191, 195 n.12 (2014) (relying on circumstantial evidence to argue
that the Costa decision was unanimous, by contrast to Van Gend, which was decided by
the narrowest of margins (four to three votes)).
171. See Philippe Manin, The Nicolo Case of the Conseil d'Etat: French
ConstitutionalLaw and the Supreme Administrative Court'sAcceptance of the Primacy
of Community Law over Subsequent National Statute Law, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
499, 511 (1991) (discussing Patrick Frydman's Nicolo submission as Commissaire du
Gouvernment in that case).
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supremacy of EU law and the working out of its jurisdictional
implications,1 72 to its recent expansion in Melloni of the charter's
primacy over national law,1 73 the ECJ has been highly protective of its
capacity to control the relation between national and European legal
orders. The Luxembourg judges have reasserted and refined the
supremacy of the EU Treaty and have drawn out its bold jurisdictional
74
and institutional implications.1

How

national

apex

courts

have

reacted

to

the

ECJ's

constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, and specifically to the
supremacy holdings, is critical for understanding the origins of identity
federalism in the EU. National courts are typically seen as resistant to
the ECJ's claims, and often willing to offer counterclaims grounded in
their own national legal orders.1 75 The national challenge to the
supremacy of European law and the primacy of its norms to those
originating in domestic legal orders takes the form of a theoretical
account about dual, or reciprocal, supremacy. The gist of this view is
that, by virtue of the limited constitutional and institutional capacities
of the EU, only the cooperation or acceptance of national constitutional
guardians can give EU law "an impact on legal reality."1 76 The "full

172. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA
1978 E.C.R. 630, 644, $ 21 ("Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction,
apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on
individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may
conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.").
173. E.C.J. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, 2013 E.C.R. 1
(holding that the primacy of the Treaty involves obligation on national courts to set aside
national law even when European norm is not directly effective). For analysis, see
Leonard F.M. Besselink, The Parametersof Constitutional Conflict After Melloni, 39
EUR. L. REV. 531 (2014).
174. In recent cases, the ECJ has found itself in a position to balance, and
occasionally constrain, its supremacy claims as it comes into conflict with other
fundamental principles such legal certainty. See E.C.J. Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten
v. Burgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, 2010 E.C.R. ¶ 67 (allowing national legislation
to stand, exceptionally and for overriding considerations of legal certainty, grant a
provisional suspension of the usual effect which EU law has on conflicting national law).
On prevention of retroactivity given considerations of legal certainty, see E.C.J. Case C25/14, UNIS v. SNRT, 2015 ¶51 (public procurement contracts can be executed even if
violate EU law)); res judicata (E.C.J. Impresa Pizzarotti, Case C-213/13, Impresa
Pizzarotti & C. SpA v. Comune di Bari, EU:C:2014:2067, ¶¶ 58-59; see also E.C.J. Case
C-379/15, Association France Nature Environment v. Premier ministre and Ministre de
l'Ecologie, du Developpement durable et de l'Energie, EU:C:2016:603 (July 28, 2016). In
most of these cases, the ECJ mediated balancing between two principles with different
pedigree-national and supranational-but is rather internal to EU law. See Katy
Sowery, Reconciling Primacy and Environmental Protection:Association FranceNature
Environment, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1164 (2017).
175. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has held that Polish law trumps EU law,
and threatened to use the ultra vires doctrine in preserving the ability of the "Republic
of Poland to continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic state." TK (Polish
Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case 18/04, ¶ 11 (Pol.).
176. Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the European Legal
Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 323, 346 (Grainne de Bdrca & Paul P. Craig eds.,
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reception" of EU law thus "depends on its incorporation into the

constitutional orders of the Member States and its affirmation by their
supreme courts." 177 While the ECJ and national apex courts both claim
ultimate authority, neither claim by itself captures the nature of
constitutional authority within the EU; only both perspectives, in
tandem, do. The reception into national law of the ECJ's supremacy
doctrine, according to such a view, is not exogenous to the supremacy
78
doctrine; rather, it becomes a constitutive part of the doctrine itself.1
79
EU supremacy is "necessarilybi-dimensional"1 in the sense that it is
co-constituted by two perspectives, each originating from within legal
orders that make mutually incompatible claims on one another.

According to this account, the ECJ's supremacy holdings stand neither
higher nor lower but alongside and on an equal plane with the

doctrines of national courts that incorporate-or not-the
supranational doctrine into the constitutional orders of the several
80

member states.1
The ensuing account is one of integration as coordination, not

fusion.181 Recent scholarship has attempted to back up this accountwith a historical narrative.1 8 2 The assertiveness of the Court of Justice,
is portrayed here as an instance of judicial activism. Rather than themuch-needed textual anchor for the court's constitutional revolution,
83
the Treaty of Rome is seen as a "fundamentally ambiguous"1 text that!

2011) ("There is a second dimension to the [primacy] matter, which is decisive for
determining whether the Court's doctrines have an impact on legal reality: the attitude
of national courts and other institutions."). See also Weiler, supra note 35, at 13 ("[B]oth:
in fact and in law, ultimate authority still rests in national constitutional orders which.,
r
sanction supremacy, define its parameters, and typically place limitations on it.").
177. Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267, 275-76 (1982) [hereinafter Weiler, The
Community System].
178. For a critical discussion, see Vlad Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in
EU Constitutionalism (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
179. Weiler, The Community System, supra note 177, at 275.
180. See also Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR.
L.J. (1995) 259, 264 (commenting that the relations between the national and
supranational legal orders does not have "any all-purpose superiority of one system over
another.").
181. See id. at 263-64 ("Once we have established this doctrine of the supremacy
of Community law, however, the question inevitably to be posed is whether there is any
need at all for an elaborate theory about interaction of distinct systems. If system X
enjoys supremacy over system Y, why trouble to have a theory about separate systems,
rather than a theory which acknowledges the fact that Y belongs to X as subsystem of
it?").
182. See, e.g., Antoine Vauchez, The TransnationalPolitics of Judicialization.Van
Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1 (2010).
183. See Morten Rasmussen, Revolutionizing EuropeanLaw: A History of the Van
Gend en Loos Judgment, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 136, 145 (2014) [hereinafter Rasmussen,
Revolutionizing European Law]. A useful study is Morten Rasmussen, The Origins of a
Legal Revolution-the Early History of the European Court of Justice, 14 J. EUR.
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could not offer the needed textual grounding for the court's
constitutional revolution. The treaty was negotiated with due
realpolitik alertness to the challenges of gaining ratification in
national legislatures, in the aftermath of failures to expand the
institutional architecture of the early European Coal and Steel
Community in the direction of either a defense or of a full-blown

political community. 18 4 Accordingly, the Treaty of Rome is said to have
taken the supranational political construct away from the goal of
unification and toward enhancing the role of states in the institutional
architecture of the Common Market. 185 Its constitutionalization was
the work of jurists-a "little group of entrepreneurs" 186 -that hijacked
with impunity the political project of the six signatory states-France,
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries-disregarding their
intentions and departing from the letter and, importantly, the spirit of

their agreed-upon text. 187 The act of hijacking itself is said to have been
quite elaborate, with the grand decisions of the ECJ playing an
important, if somewhat limited, role.1 88 In one elaborate version of this
account, the court's foundational decisions were "empty vessels"1 89 that
turned into grand political moments through complex processes of
meaning-ascription staged and executed by a network of selfinterested, European-minded jurists. 90
The soundness of this criticism is open to debate. It seems at best

an exaggeration to portray the Treaty of Rome as a fundamentally
ambiguous step in the direction of integration. While it may be true
that the treaty diluted compliance mechanisms by states with their
community obligations that existed in the Treaty of Paris establishing

INTEGRATION HIST. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal
Revolution].
184. Id.
185. Evidence for this claim is given in the form of the weakening of supranational
institutions, especially the Commission and the Court of Justice, and the greater
legislative powers, including the veto, given to states as represented in the Council of
Ministers. See LEVINSON, supra note 152.
186. Antoine Vauchez, Integration Through Law: Contribution to a Socio-history
of EU PoliticalCommonsense 12 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 10, 2008).
187. See, e.g., Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of EU Law,
1950-1957: The Legal History of the Treaties of Parisand Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST.
339, 340 (2012) (arguing that "a small number of politicians and jurists managed to
insert the potential for constitutional practice into the treaties despite the conscious
attempt by the majority of the governments not to establish a European constitutional
order."). In this context, it is worth remembering that, in the large majority of cases,
subsequent treaties ratified the decisions of the court by incorporating them into the text
of the revised treaties.
188. See generally Vauchez, supra note 186.
189. Id. at 9.
190. See Rasmussen, Revolutionizing European Law, supra note 183, at 137
(calling Van Gend "a focal point for a rich patchwork of constantly reproduced historical
memory and myths used for ideological purposes").

IDENTITYFEDERALISMINEUROPEAND THE UNITED STATES

20201

241

91
the European Coal and Steel Community,1 it is also the case that, in
important respects, Rome strengthened supranational institutions.
Pointing to its much-analyzed preamble is sure to draw the ire of
commentators who see such textualism as narrow, legalistic
approaches, yet anyone with passing knowledge of treaty negotiation

knows that such language is the outcome of protracted negotiation and
192
More
ought not be dismissed as weightless pamphlets.
substantively, the rejection of proposals to replace the ECJ with an ad
hoc arbitration tribunal combined with the strengthening of the court's
preliminary reference jurisdiction in the interpretation of norms were
deeply consequential. The relatively open-ended delineation of

competencies

between

to
commission
considerably. 193

The

trope

about

and the community

states

expand

the

the

jurisdiction

hijacked

treaty

of

is

the

enabled the
community

similarly

quite

unconvincing. It is true that the received wisdom has long been that

the court's bold early doctrines were developed in splendid isolation
from public opinion. 194 The implication of that view is that only in such
a setting, and hiding behind the cover of the highly technical nature of
its cases that could never appeal to the larger public or even the
informed if busy national politician, could the ECJ constitutionalize
the Treaty of Rome. The day of reckoning would thus inevitably come,

191. The infringement procedure, the main legal tool for securing compliance from
states, was weakened because the ECJ could no longer levy fines. Compare Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 169-171, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], with Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, art. 44, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC
Treaty]. In addition, infringement proceedings started by the Commission were
lengthened, a two-step process. Similarly, the Treaty limited standing for private
litigants in the Court of Justice, which modified the institutional architecture of the
ECSC. This was done by "by blurring the distinction between decisions directed towards
a particular firm and general decisions and acts." See Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal
Revolution, supra note 183, at 85. The relevant cases are Case 3/54, Associazione
Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community, 1955 E.C.R. 63; Case 4/54, Industrie Siderurgiche Associate (ISA) v.
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1955 E.C.R. 91.
192. The oft-cited Preamble of the Treaty of Rome starts by "DETERMINED to lay
the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe." Treaty of Rome.
For analysis, see Joseph Weiler, Politicaland Legal Culture of EuropeanIntegration:An
Exploratory Essay, 9 INT'L J. CoNST. L. 678, 689 (2011).
193. The Court of Justice obliged, not striking down any piece of Community
legislation as ultra vires for the first four decades of European integration. See also
Tobacco Advertisement cases in the 1990s. For analysis, see generally Democracy and
Constitutionalism in the European Union: Collected Essays (Federico Mancini ed.,
2000).
194. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981) ("Tucked away in the fairyland
Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that
be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned
a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure.").

242

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:207

in this view, when the court's work would be brought into the lightand rejected. In reality, however, things were much more nuanced.
European constitutional integration was hardly the pet project of a
handful of sectarian jurists. 19 5 Connections between, on the one hand,
the ECJ, and, on the other hand, wide networks of jurists across the
continent prove that supranational constitutionalization did have roots
in the legal traditions of the member states. 196 While actual litigation
in Luxembourg was indeed the work of a number of repeat players, the

doctrines and legal strategies were not alien to legal thought and the
legal profession.1 9 7
While the conventional view of the early development of European

constitutionalism needs revisiting, it nevertheless provides the context
for understanding what one might call the dual structure of European
constitutionalism. In addition to Luxembourg's holdings, that dual
structure includes the resistance those doctrines supposedly
encountered when they came into contact with national doctrines and
national legal establishments.1 9 8 The claims of EU supremacy met, in

this account, with the counterclaims originating in the national legal
orders. As Karen Alter sums up this view, "the ECJ can say whatever
it wants, the real question is why anyone should heed it."1 99 Thus,
whatever domestic traction the supremacy claim might have within
national legal systems, its explanation is not reducible to the ECJ's

pronouncement. The sources of such traction must, rather, be sought
in the reaction of national legal orders. And, from that national
perspective, European supremacy has an additional, or second,
dimension, "which is decisive for determining whether the Court's.
doctrines have an impact on legal reality: the attitude of national

195. See, e.g., Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational
Jurist Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 21
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399 (2012).
196. For the particular-and not entirely surprising-case of the Netherlands, see
Jieskje Hollander, The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948present). On Teachings and Life, 17 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 197, 201 (2011)
(describing "the choice between unifying Europe in a federation or remaining an order of
nation states" as one "between life or death, or freedom and slavery").
197. For the role of Europeanization beyond the legal profession to social
movements, see LISA CONANT, JUSTIcE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN

UNION 3 (2002). I study this phenomenon in the context of disability rights movement in
Vlad Perju, Impairment, Discriminationand the Legal Construction of Disability in the
European Union and the United States, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279 (2011).
198. For a study, see Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU
Constitutionalism, supra note 178.
199. Karen Alter, The European Court's Political Power: the Emergence of an
AuthoritativeInternational Court in the European Union, 19 WEST EUR. POL. 458, 459
(1996).
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200
The dual structure of European
courts and other institutions."

constitutionalism informs an account of reciprocal supremacy.
Focusing on the initial encounter, generations of EU scholars have
answered that question by pointing out that resistance characterized
20 1
A
the reactions of national legal orders through their apex courts.
20 2
CohnJ,203
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resistance to the ECJ's claim of absolute and unconditional supremacy
of EU law. When member states recognized the primacy of EU law,
209
by using their national constitutions
they did it, with few exceptions,
basis for such limited recognition.
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200. de Witte, supra note 176, at 346; see also Weiler, supra note 35, at 13 ("both
in fact and in law, ultimate authority still rests in national constitutional orders which
sanction supremacy, define its parameters, and typically place limitations on it.").
201. As Neil Walker correctly pointed out, there is wide agreement on the
descriptive basis of constitutional pluralism. Yet agreement on those bases push the
normative analysis in the direction of pluralism. See Neil Walker, Constitutional
Pluralism Revisited, 22 EUR. L.J. 333, 346 n.46. For a challenge to that consensus, see
Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism, supra note 178.
202. Conseil d'Etat, 1 Mar. 1968, Syndicat General de Fabricants de Semoules de
France (1970) CMLR 395 (Fr.).
203. German Federal Constitutional Court, May 29, 1974, Solange I
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft von Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und.
Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974]
204. Conseil d'Etat Dec. 22, 1978, Case Ministre de l'interieur c. Cohn-Bendit (Fr.).
205. (Corte Cost.) (Constitutional Court) Dec. 18, 1973, Judgment 183 Frontini v
Ministero delle Finanze (It.).
206. German Federal Constitutional Court, Oct. 12, 1993, Maastricht, BVerfGE
89, 155; German Federal Constitutional Court, Oct. 12, 1993, Brunner v. European
Union Treaty, 1994 1 CMLR 57.
207. German Federal Constitutional Court, June 30, 2009, Lisbon Treaty
Constitutionality Case, BVerfGE (2009).
208. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case no. 18/04 (Accession
Treaty).
209. For instance, of the original six member states, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands seem to have acknowledged that authority on the same basis as the ECJ's
Costa jurisprudence. See George Thill, La primaute et l'effet direct du droit
communautaire dans la jurisprudence luxembourgoise, 6 REVUE FRANQAISE DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF 978 (1990). For case law, see Cour de Cassation July 14, 1954; Conseil
d'Etat Nov. 21, 1984, Bellion et al. v. Minister for the Civil Service (Fr.). For the
Netherlands, see Alfred Kellermann, Supremacy of Community law in the Netherlands,
14 EUR. L. REV. 175 (1989). At the same time, the national constitutional text
unsurprisingly played a role in Luxembourg and Netherlands. It was the text that
enabled the courts to issue the decisions they did.
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rested upon Costa itself.210 Even after some of the original
constitutional anchors metamorphosed into provisions specifically
dealing with EU membership, national courts rejected absolute and
unconditional

supremacy in favor of a relative

and conditional

acceptance. 2 11 As a matter of EU doctrine, using international law to
frame the national reception of the European legal order was in and of
itself contrary to the ECJ's interpretation that the treaty is an

independent and original source of law which forms a legal order that
is autonomous from international law. 2 12 Thus, resting the authority
of EU law on national constitutional text, rather than the EU Treaty,
is interpreted as a rejection of Costa's claim to unconditional and
absolute supremacy of supranational norms.
It goes beyond the scope of this Article to undergo a complete

assessment of this conventional account of reciprocal supremacy. 213
This Article only suggests here that the view according to which
national resistance was inevitable given the radical claims of European
constitutionalism, is far from self-evident. In a different interpretation,
the reception of EU law, including its supremacy claims, into national

legal orders was far less resistant. Grounding acceptance on the
national constitution,

as opposed to EU doctrine,

was far from

unreasonable. Neither was, in fact, the analogy between European and
international law. Not only should one expect national courts to refer

to international law, which is technically correct since the Treaty of
Rome was, after all, an international treaty, but one should also expect
national judges to use the doctrines of the ECJ strategically, at least
in legal systems where there existed long-simmering doctrinal debates

about the place of international law.214 It is perfectly understandable
that national legal systems would use the closest available anchor to

process the claims of the ECJ. This is true across jurisdictions. In
Belgium, for example, where jurists contemplated a constitutional
amendment to change an "exceptionally retrograde 2 15 model that

210. There are exceptions. One is Luxembourg. See Thill, La primaute, supra note
209. See also Cour de Cassation July 14, 1954; Conseil d'Etat Nov. 21, 1984, Bellion et
al. v. Minister for the Civil Service. The second exception is the Netherlands. See
Kellermann, supra note 209, at 177.
211. This is Germany. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [ Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12 1993, M'fAASTRICHT 89, 155 (Ger.).
212. I use international law in the general sense. For a suggestion that
international law should rather be understood in the narrower sense of peremptory
norms (jus cogens), and a schematic account of possible implications, see Henry G.
Schermers, The Scale in Balance: National ConstitutionalCourts v. The Courtof Justice,
27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 97, 98 (1990).
213. See Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism, supra
note 178.
214. See Manin, supra note 171, at 511.
215. See Case Note, Conflicts between Treaties and Subsequently Enacted Statutes
in Belgium: Etat Belge v. S.A. "FromagerieFranco-SuisseLe Ski", 72 MIcH. L. REV. 118,
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allowed later-in-time legislation to trump international law, national

courts used the opportunity of EU law to reverse that system and,
while referring to the Costa rationale, grounded their holding in the
216
In France, positioning in
"very nature of international treaty law."
relation to the EU became part of simmering conflicts between the two

supreme courts, Conseil d'Etat and Court de cassation, on the "correct"
2 17
It revealed
interpretation of Article 55 of the French Constitution.
deep divisions on the question of the powers of the executive,
legislative, and the judiciary in interpreting international treaties
2 18
under the constitutional architecture of the French Fifth Republic.
Unsurprisingly, it was not Costa itself as much as the national
judges' vision of their own role that shaped the terms of national
reception, more so at the moment of first impact than later. 219 For,
again as one would expect, the vision and doctrines of national apex
courts evolved in time. When, two decades after it rejected the
supremacy of EU law in the Nicolo judgment, the French supreme

administrative court reversed that decision, 220 that reversal could be
seen in no other way than as "a full-blown success for European
integration through law." 22 1 That reversal, like the earlier recognition

120 (1973) (illustrating the Belgian legal tradition of giving effect to subsequent national
laws over earlier treaties in the case of conflicts between the two).
216. See id. (analyzing the Belgian judiciary's establishment of treaty preeminence
over national law).
217. 1958 CONST. 55; see CE Sect., Mar. 1, 1968, 62814, Rec. Lebon 149 (Fr.)
(denying the supremacy of a treaty over a subsequent conflicting national law); see also
Gerald L. Neuman, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 306 (noting that the Conseil d'Etat and
the Cour de cassation disagreed over whether later statutes superseded earlier treaties).
218. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Oct.
27, 1970, Gaz. Pal. 1970, 90, 6-7 (Fr.) (advancing a more favorable stand than Conseil
d'Etat towards European Law, even though again Article 55 of the constitution serves as
the legal basis);-see also Gerhard Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National
Courts?, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 3, 8 (1974) ("Under the French legal system, only the
executive may interpret public international treaties. Such an interpretation may
already implicitly predetermine the solution of the conduct between an international
treaty and a municipal law. This practice may not be particularly conducive for French
courts to develop a judicial policy ensuring the supremacy of international treaties. This
may in turn have some effect on the attitude of French courts towards Community Law").
219. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 (asserting the
supremacy of European Economic Community law); see generally THE EUROPEAN COURT
AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE & JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds.,

1998).
220. The French Conseil d'Etat signaled it might reverse its stance as early as
1986, in Smanor, and followed through in 1990, Nicolo. See CE, Nov. 19, 1986, 41852
45416, Rec. Lebon; CE Ass., Oct. 20 1989, 108243, Rec. Lebon. The ground for acceptance
of EU law is Art. 55 of French Constitution, not the reasoning of the ECJ about specificity
of EU law. By contrast to 1975 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which
based its decision on both Art. 55 and Costa. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] Decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15, 1975, Rec. 19 (Fr.).
221. Jens Pldtner, Report on France, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS: DOCTRINE & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 219, at 41, 48.
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of EU authority in the constitutional context, 222 rested both on the

provisions of the French constitution and on the acceptance of Costa,
alongside the national constitution, at the basis of EU supremacy. 22 3
The available constitutional text, the nature of the ongoing doctrinal
and jurisprudential debates, and, importantly, the sheer magnitude of
the ECJ's claims and novelty of the situation into which they threw
national courts-and at times even the ECJ itself2 2 4 -provide an
explanation for those references. It would be the height of formalism to
abstract them entirely from their context and interpret them as a

rejection of Costa and of the absolute supremacy of EU law.
This radical claim of European constitutionalism, on the one hand,

and the complex counterreactions of national courts, some of them
amplified ex post, on the other hand, provide the origins of identity
federalism in the EU. For, as shown in the next subpart, identity
provided from the beginning a purportedly principled ground and
malleable cover for resisting European integration. Some of this
resistance was, in the abstract, legitimate. National legal orders were
concerned that supranational norms did not provide sufficient
protections to either the constitutionalist (fundamental rights) or the

democratic guarantees of their own domestic legal orders. Yet, identity
became a useful cover behind which constitutional nationalism could
hide itself until it could emerge in full view in prime time.
B. Identity and Human Rights
The early history of identity federalism's entrance in European
constitutionalism is German through and through. 225 It was in a
decision from Karlsruhe that identity made its first-notably

222. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ch. mixte,
May 24, 1975, Bull. civ., No. 4 (Fr.) (holding that a European Economic Community
treaty had greater authority than a municipal law under Article 55 of the French
Constitution).
223. In that case, Attorney-General Touffait asked the Court to hold EU
supremacy on the basis of ECJ doctrine in Costa, not Article 55. The Court chose both
Article 55 and Costa's reasoning, and recast the conflict as internal to French law: as
between legislatively implementing the international law, and maintaining the
statutory norm. See Plotner, supra note 221, at 45.
224. In Van Gend, the ECJ referred to the European legal order as a new legal
order "of international law." The international law qualification was dropped in
subsequent cases. See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming
van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1
(establishing that domestic courts must recognize and enforce certain rights conferred
by EU law).
225. See generally Polzin, supra note 65 (discussing the evolution of constitutional
identity in Germany).
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In Solange 1 [1974],227 the German
Constitutional Court subscribed to the ECJ's view that the European
legal order "forms an independent system of law flowing from an
subdued-appearance.

autonomous legal source." 228 What it did reject was the ECJ's claim to

2 29
Specifically, the constitutional
the supremacy of EU law in Costa.
judges held that, when conflicts arise between European secondary
legislation and the human rights provisions of the German Basic Law,
national judges retained "the right to review the validity of the
Community legislation-that is, to render it without effect within the
jurisdiction it controls." 230 The grounds for that right, and for the
231
The
national resistance to Costa, were to be found in human rights.
German court was concerned about the missing human rights
guarantees at the European level equivalent to those afforded under
the Basic Law. 232 If European law recognized the supremacy that
Costa claims it has over national law, and if European law offers no
233
the fundamental rights that the Basic
protection to human rights,
Law recognizes to its subjects could conceivably be violated with
impunity. The upshot is that it is not the European doctrine of

supremacy, as articulated by the ECJ, that determines the effect of
European legal norms in cases of their potential conflict with human
rights norms, but rather the independent assessment of national

courts, making their decisions on the basis of a feature-human
rights-they deem essential for national and supranational legal
orders alike.

Solange I presents the protection of human rights as an
234
of the German constitutional order.
"inalienable, essential feature"
Famously, the German Basic Law makes the right to dignity and the

226.

For further discussion, see Vlad Perju, On Uses and Misuses of Human Rights

in European Constitutionalism,in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOcRACY, AND LEGITIMACY IN A
WORLD OF DIsORDER 263, 268-74 (Silja Voeneky & Gerald L. Neuman eds., 2018)

[hereinafter Perju, Uses and Misuses].
227. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29,
1974, 37 Solange I271 [hereinafter Solange 1].
228. See id. ("[I]n agreement with the law developed by the European Court of
Justice," the Court writes, "Community law is neither a component part of the national
legal system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from
an autonomous legal source"); see also Liitticke, 31 BVerfGE 145 (June 9, 1971).
229. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court, Solange I; see also Case 6/64,
Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.
230. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. It should be noted
that such pressure pre-dated Solange I. In a decision from 1966, the German
Constitutional Court indicated it might have the right to review European legal norms.
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 16, 1966,
22 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 293 (298).

231. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I.
232. See id.
233. But see Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 274-80 (arguing that
human rights are a fundamental part of the European legal order).
234. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I.
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democratic nature of the state unamendable. 235 As the German judges
put it, "[t]he part of the Basic Law dealing with fundamental rights is
an inalienable, essential feature of the valid Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany and one which forms part of the constitutional
structure of the Basic Law." 2 36 That basic structure forms the basis of

the "identity" of the Basic Law. 23 7 It thus remained incumbent upon
the German Constitutional Court to protect the German constitutional
order by mandating the acceptance of the claim of European
supremacy in terms that were conditional on the preservation of its
identity.
How do human rights dovetail into an identitarian paradigm? The
relation certainly has its complexities. While constitutional identity

develops in time, the passing of time changes identity. At the same
time, however, identity is also that which cannot change (merely)
through the passing of time. The German Constitutional Court holds,
in this context, that fundamental rights represent an aspect of the
German constitutional identity that cannot and will not be
surrendered to the supranational level. 2 38 Joseph Weiler provides a
theoretical account of this complex relation. Fundamental rights, in his
view, are at the same time fundamental boundaries. 239 Boundaries
here are a "metaphor for the principle of enumerated powers or limited
competences which are designed to guarantee that in certain areas
communities (rather than individuals) should be free to make their
own social choices without interference from above." 24 0 The EU is the

"above," the threat to aspects of identity through which communities
distinguish themselves from others and, generally, from the outside
world. Rights are, in Weiler's account, "both a source of, and index for,
cross-national
differentiation
and
not
only
cross-national
assimilation." 2 41 They represent core values that are part of selfunderstanding-a community's "particularized identity rooted in

235. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BAsIc LAW], Art. 1, 20, 79 Abs. 3, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-gg/englischgg.html#p0019
[https://perma.cc/SQ3G-XTM6] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
236. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I.
237. See id. at [43]. For an argument along similar lines, see Fabbrini & Saj6, supra
note 11, at 463 (noting that German Constitutional Courts have limited the direct
application of EU laws when they conflict with fundamental German constitutional
principles).
238. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAw], Art. 79 Abs. 3; see 37 BVerfGE 271.
239. See JOsEPH WEILER, FundamentalRights and FundamentalBoundaries:On
the Conflict of Standards and Values in the Protectionof Human Rights in the European
Legal Space, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 102, 106 (1999) (arguing that
fundamental boundaries and fundamental rights are part of the same societal choice
between promoting the fundamental right of the individual and the fundamental right
of the government to act in the general interest).
240. Id. at 103-04.
241. Id. at 105.
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and political culture." 242 Rights are inherently fragile since

249

they are the outcome of clashes of deeply felt values and normative
projects at the national level. Since "[h]uman rights are almost

invariably the expression of a compromise between competing social
goods in the polity," 24 3 the process of European integration should
tread carefully so as not to interfere with those constitutional
accomplishments that everyone with passing knowledge of modern
history knows to be distressingly fragile.
Solange I relied on human rights to contain the vertical
European
into
order
constitutional
of German
integration
federalism. 244 The practical effect of those limits was itself quite
limited. 24 5 For the period of a little over a decade, until the German

Constitutional Court became satisfied that the European legal order
had developed protections of human rights that were comparable to

those afforded under the Basic Law and reversed it, 246 Solange I was
never applied as ground for nullifying the legal effect of European
247
And it may well be that its
secondary legislation in Germany.
limited practical role was part of the reason for the subsequent
radicalization of German constitutional resistance to the project of
European unification. After all, Solange I had acquiesced to the ECJ's
248
Seen
holding of the Treaty of Rome as an independent source of law.
from the perspective of the search for effective tools to resist European
integration, Solange I was in a sense only a half measure. Particularly
effective opposition to European integration required taking the ECJ

242. Id.
243. See id. at 106.
244. [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I.
245. At least so long as that effect is measured in application of the doctrine in
subsequent case-law. More difficult to gauge is its impact on the landscape of European
constitutionalism as a mere "law in the books." The German Constitutional Court took
credit in Solange II for this development at the European level, although its self-serving
congratulatory mood should be viewed with skepticism. See G. Federico Mancini & David
T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 187
(1994) ("It would be an exaggeration to say that the European Court was bulldozed into
protecting fundamental rights by rebellious national courts."). It is also worth recalling
that Solange I was met, both domestically and in Europe, with dismay and
disparagement. See Hans Peter-Ipsen, BVerfG versus EuGH re "Grundrechte", 10
EUROPARECHT 1 (1975) (arguing that Solange I was "wrong ... fallacious, superfluous,
and legally-politically mistaken ... [and] groundless.").
246. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.
22, 1986, 73 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 339.

247. For a watering-down of the doctrine, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
July 25, 1979, 52 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
[Federal Constitutional Court]
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 187.

248. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I ("[I]n agreement with
the law developed by the European Court of Justice, [the German court] adheres to its
settled view that Community law is neither a component part of the national legal
system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from an
autonomous legal source.").
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seriously that autonomy and supremacy are the double helix of
European constitutionalism-only to then reject them both. 249
Interestingly, for the purpose of this Article, the search for a more
effective strategy did not require abandoning the role of identity. If
anything, it meant bringing identity more prominently into the
foreground of national constitutional resistance.
In the Maastricht decision, the German judges rejected the claim
to autonomy of the European
legal order and
European
constitutionalism wholesale. 25 0 The German court moved from human
rights to democracy, and. the related interpretation of limited,
conferred powers from the member states to the EU, as the grounds of
its resistance to supranational, European law. The German judges held
that the imperative of democratic self-government,
also an
unamendable constitutional provision and implicitly part of German
constitutional identity, 25 1 provided the necessary ground to dis-apply

within Germany the EU laws that the national judges deemed to have
been enacted ultra vires, that is, in violation of the principle of
conferred powers. 252
Maastricht theorizes explicitly and unabashedly the European
legal order as a subset of the international legal order:
The Maastricht Treaty constitutes an agreement under international law
establishing a compound of States of the Member States which is oriented
towards further development. The inter-governmental community is dependent
upon the Treaty continually being constantly revitalized by the Member States;

249.

See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.

12, 1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT

[BVERFGE] 155;

BVerfG,
2
BvR
2134/92
&
2159/92,
Oct.
12,
1993,
http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/BrunnerSentence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5SY-YX7T] (archived Oct. 27, 2019), translated in 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 58
(1994). As one scholar put it, the reduction of supranational commitments to the aims of
international law was a "slap in the face of [Walter Hallstein's] idea of legal community."
JO ERIC KHUSHAL MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION 192 (2013) (quoting Ingolf Pernice,

BVerfG, EGMR, und die Rechtgemeinschaft, 23 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
WIRTSCHAFTRECHT 705, 706 (2004) (Ger.).
250. See 89 BVerfGE 155 ("The Maastricht Treaty constitutes an agreement under
international law establishing a compound of States of the Member States which is
oriented towards further development. The inter-governmental community is dependent
upon the Treaty continually being constantly revitalized by the Member States; the
fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensue from the will of the contracting
parties.").

251. See ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, The Future of Political Autonomy:
Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and
Individualization, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mirjam Kinkler & Tine
Stein eds., 2017).
252. Id.
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the fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensue from the will of the
253
contracting parties.

The Treaty of Maastricht is thus seen as establishing a community of
states, whose identity is respected and autonomy guaranteed, as is the
case in any international organization-"and not with membership in
2 54
The conclusion, replete with international
a single European State."
lingo, is that "Germany is therefore maintaining its status as a

sovereign State in its own right as well as the status of sovereign
equality with other States in the sense of Art. 2, sub-para 1 of the UN
Charter of 26 June, 1945."255 At the time of German reunification, as

the Constitutional Court took it upon itself the task of replenishing the
normative resources of the German state, German constitutionalism

demanded that nation-states

remain the controlling

agents

of

256

European integration.
In this brave (old) world, human rights are both insufficiently
effective as the central medium for national resistance to European
unification as well as too important a category to dismiss them
outright. The task, then, is to repackage them. The starting point of
the repackaging strategy is the depiction in both Solange I and II of
human rights as an element of constitutional identity. 257 Interestingly,
however, self-government itself is part of the identity package,
following Maastricht'sdepiction of a community that promises to itself

to preserve a space for politics where decisions affecting the life of each
25 8
What, one might wonder, of the
member will be made collectively.
inherent normative tension between human rights, on the one hand,

253. See 89 BVerfGE 155; BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993,
http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.s/euroconstitution/library/BrunnerSentence.pdf
[https://perma.c/P5SY-YX7T] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). As one scholar put it, the
reduction of supranational commitments to the aims of international law was "a slap in
the face of [Walter Hallstein's] idea of legal community." See MURKENS, supra note 249,
at 192.
254. See 89 BVerfGE 155, [16].
255. See id. at [21]. The court would continue along the same lines in its Lisbon
judgment. Christian Calliess calls it "almost tragic" that, in adopting an international
law perspective, "the court is adopting this restrictive democratic approach towards the
very organization which-contrary to classic institutional organizations like the UN and
WTO-actually has a parliament that is directly elected by its citizens and has farreaching decision-making and control powers." Christian Calliess, The Future of the
Eurozone and the Role of the German FederalConstitutional Court, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 402,
406 (2012).
256. See MURKENS, supra note 249, at 154 (arguing that the court's use of metaconcepts such as identity, statehood or sovereignty can be explained as a show of force
vis-a-vis the ECJ, caused by the failure to reconceptualize public law, especially "the
constitutional relation with the European Union").
257. See Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 283 (noting that both Solange
I and Solange II rested on the German Constitution's guarantee of a minimum standard
of protection for fundamental human rights).
258. See id. at 290-91.
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and democracy, on the other? If national constitutional identity is to be
coherent, its component elements, including human rights and the
commitment to self-government, must be made coherent. 259 This is not
only a normative challenge but also, given the judgments of the
German Constitutional Court, a doctrinal problem.

Doctrinally, one might expect a Solange III that sorts out the effect
of democratic self-government on human rights, through the lens of
constitutional identity. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the
Solange III label has been applied, among others, to the Maastricht26 0
and Lisbon decisions, 26 1 as well as cases in the European Arrest

Warrant saga. 2 62 So much has been included under that rubric that
perhaps Solange III is best understood not so much as a case in
waiting, 263 but rather as the name, and an appropriate one at that, of
an entire age of German, and indeed European, constitutionalism.
C. The Constitutionalizationof Identity
The analysis of how identity became constitutional

doctrine

proceeds in a few steps. The first is a study of the "constitutional
identity lock" in the German legal system under the Lisbon judgment
(subpart B.1.).264 The second is an analysis of the migration of identity
across European legal orders, including the empowerment of courts
and substantive difficulties that the adoption of doctrine of identity has
created across national legal systems (subpart B.2.). Finally, subpart
B.3. presents the crescendo from the early mention of identity in the
judgment of the German Constitutional Court to the far less benign
recent decision of the
Hungarian
Constitutional
Court on
"constitutional
self-identity"
that
validated
the
Hungarian
government's refusal to apply EU regulations regarding the acceptance

of asylum seekers.

259. See Joseph Weiler et al., EuropeanDemocracy and Its Critique, 18 WEST EUR.
POL. 4, 34 (1995) ("Constitutionalism, despite its counter-majoritarian effect, is regarded
as a complementary principle to majoritarianism rather than its negation.").
260. See, e.g., Kevin D. Makowski, Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional
Court's Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 16 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 155, 174 (2014).
261. See, e.g., Jacques Ziller, The German Constitutional Court's Friendliness
towards European Law: On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the
Ratificationof the Treaty of Lisbon, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 53, 56 (2010) (noting that the Lisbon
Treaty builds on the German Constitutional Court's "well-known solange theory").
262. See, e.g., Mathias Hong, Human Dignity, Identity Review of the European
Arrest Warrantand the Court of Justice as a Listener in the Dialogueof Courts: SolangeIII and Aranyosi, 12 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 549, 550 (2016).
263. The possibility that Solange III is a case in waiting has occasionally surfaced
in German constitutional scholarship. See MURKENS, supra note 249, at 165.
264. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 267.
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1. Identity and Democracy
G. Federico Mancini, a former judge at the ECJ, wrote that "the
closer the [European] Union moves towards statehood, the greater the
resistance to the attainment of this goal becomes."2 65 Mancini captures
accurately the historical moment at the end of the Cold War, when,
just as the stars of history seemed aligned to further the project of
European federalism, 26 6 the protection of national identity
transitioned to the supranational level. The Treaty of Maastricht
included a provision that "[t]he Union shall respect the national
identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are
26 7
The historical explanation
founded on the principles of democracy."

for the Europeanization of the protection of national identity has to do
with the tradeoff that the project of unification had to pay for
significant integration in several policy fields. Specifically, the
protection of national identity was one of a number-and certainly not

the most significant-of concessions to Germany, which made the
difficult and momentous step of giving up its national currency when
26 8
entering the Eurozone.
The national identity clause was revised in the Amsterdam

Treaty, specifically by detaching identity from democracy. The new
Article 6(3) provides that "[t]he Union shall respect the national
identities of its Member States," thus allowing for the possibility, and
arguably inviting, an interpretation of identity that goes beyond selfgovernment. 269 Enter, then, Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European
Union, which provides that

265. G. Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 29, 31
(1994).
266. No coincidence, then, to find at that time the intervention. See Tim
Koopmans, Federalism:The Wrong Debate, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1992)
("For the future of the peace in the world, the important thing is probably not to abolish
States or to replace old States by new States, but to devise levels of coordinate
government.").
267. Treaty on European Union, art. F, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht].
268. By this I mean that it should be interpreted as a concession made to Germany.
On the idea that guarantee of national identity was introduced to counterbalance the
deeper integration in Maastricht, see Monica Claes, National Identity: Trump Card or
Up for Negotiation?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION, supra note 13, at 109, 118; Theodore Konstadinides, Constitutional
Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework
of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 195, 198
(2012); Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1435.
269. Article F(1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was later replaced by Article 6(3)
TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts,
art. 1, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] ("The Union
shall respect the national identities of its Member States"). In response to the invitation
to go beyond self-government, the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

r.
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[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member States ...
as well as their
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. 2 70

A few observers have interpreted the Lisbon provision as ratifying
the case law of the German Constitutional Court on the resistance to
European supremacy. 271 The protection of constitutional national
identity has been called "a beacon of European constitutional
pluralism" 27 2 and has been interpreted as "a strong re-affirmation of
the non-federal structure of the European Union. 2 73 Indeed, the
German Constitutional Court wasted little time in using the identity
provision to draw anew, and in a far more visible form then before, the
contours of its national sovereignty. In the Lisbon decision, the
German judges included a list of the domains of public policy that must
remain within the full control of German citizens. The court held that

particularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to
democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive and formal
criminal law (1), on the disposition of the monopoly on the use of force
by the police within the state and by the military towards the exterior
(2), fundamental. fiscal decisions on public revenue and public
expenditure, the latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by
social policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of living
conditions in a social state and (4), decisions of particular cultural
importance, for example on family law, the school and education
system, and on dealing with religious communities (5).274

European Union reads: "national identities of the Member States and the organisation
of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels." Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389 [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
270. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 3a, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
271. See, e.g., Giuseppe Martinico, What Lies Behind Article 4(2) TEU?, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supranote 13, at 93,
95 (arguing that the Lisbon Treaty incorporated principles from the German
Constitutional Court's Solange decisions).
272. See Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1426 (the authors also argued that
Art. 4(2) gave European expression to the controlimiti jurisprudence of the Italian and
German Constitutional Court).
273. See also Leonard F. M. Besselink, Nationaland ConstitutionalIdentity Before
and After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 48 (remarking that "the provision of Article 4(2)
EU forms an important qualification of the rule on the primacy of EU law, and a
modification of the case law under Costa v. ENEL.").
274. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2728/13,
Jan.
14,
2014,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2014/01/rs20140
114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47BA732.1_cid394?
_blob-publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/BH88-H8SX] (archived on Oct. 27, 2019).
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It did not take long for critics to berate this list as political,
random, and basically unsupported by any account of the nature of the
state. 275 Part of the problem is undoubtedly the court's own role in
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the protection, and implicitly the
meaning, of national constitutional sovereignty, as "the task of the
276
But when courts take on the
Federal Constitutional Court alone."
identity, they entrench
of
constitutional
meaning
the
of
defining
task
integration in
supranational
and
sovereignty,
identity,
of
limits
the

ways that are almost impossible to overcome. 2 77

Interestingly, the fundamental limitation, in the court's
interpretation, is subsumed to the imperative of respective national
identity as outlined in Article 79(3) of the Basic Law ("unverfiigbare
Verfassungsidentitdt").2 78 The court had already interpreted that
provision in its Maastricht decision as a ban on subsequent
supranational transfers of sovereign powers that could erode the
279
But in Lisbon it offers a more
fundamentals of German democracy.
robust, and more protectionist approach. Specifically, it interprets the

EU as an association of sovereign national states (a so-called
Staatenverbund).2 80 EU member states may transfer sovereign rights
to the EU but they do not thereby remain depleted of sovereignty. 281 It
follows, in this view, that whatever sovereignty supranational
institutions can claim is derived, rather than autonomous.
The colonizing tendencies of the concept of identity are apparent
in recent case law of German courts, where identity review has become
the ground of resistance to European federalism that distills and
integrates previous doctrines of resistance (human rights, ultra vires

The German
& Christoph M6llers,
275. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam
Constitutional Court Says "Jazu Deutschland!", 10 GERMAN L.J. 1241 (2009).
14,
2014,
2728/13,
Jan.
276. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2
l 4O
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocsfDownloads/EN/2014/01/rs
114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47BA732.1_cid394?
_blob=publicationFile&v-1 [https://perma.cc/BH88-H8SX] (archived on Oct. 27, 2019).
277. In France, by contrast, the task of ascribing meaning to identity has been
taken up by scholars rather than courts. See Bertrand Mathieu, Les rapports normatifs
entre le droit communautaire et le droit national: Bilan et incertitudes relatifs aux
evolutions recentes de la jurisprudencedes juges constitutionnelet administratiffrangais,
REVUE FRANQAISE DE DROIT CONTITUTIONNEL 675 (2007) (arguing that "[t]he principle

of laiciti, the definition of the persons entitled to vote in French political elections, the
prohibition to give specific rights to ethnic, linguistic and other minorities and the
definition of the criteria for access to public functions" are part of constitutional identity).
See generally Jan Komarek, The Placeof ConstitutionalCourts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST.
L. REV. 420 (2013) (analyzing conflicts between constitutional courts and the EU).
278. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 267.

279.

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12,

1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 155.

280. See 123 BVerfGE 267.
281. Id.
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review). 28 2 In a case involving the execution of a European arrest
warrant, the judges bridged the identity and human rights review to

hold that human dignity is part of constitutional identity and part of
its human rights mandate. 283 Accordingly, identity is used to establish
a separate national track for the protection of human rights whose
activation does not depend, as the court had previously held, 284 on a
structural deficiency of the protection of human rights at the
supranational level. The national track is not subsidiary, and can thus
be invoked, through the human dignity guarantee, by all rights
holders. 28 5
2. The Migration of Identity
The versatility, malleability, and effectiveness of identity review
in German constitutional law explains its extraordinary appeal and
fast migration across jurisdictions within the EU. German identity

282. Both of the two preliminary references that the German Constitutional Court
has ever sent to Luxembourg mention constitutional identity. In 2014, the German
Constitutional Court sent a preliminary reference on whether the outright monetary
transaction (OMT) mechanisms of the European Central Bank, which allowed the
purchase of governments' bonds on the secondary market, exceeded the mandate of the
ECB and violated the EU prohibition of monetary funding. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al.,
Feb. 7, 2014, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/
2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47
BA732.1_cid394?_blob=publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/XD3H-UZXZ] (archived
Oct. 27, 2019). The German court included in the preliminary reference language to the
effect that it- Karlsruhe-has the right to decide whether the OMT decision "could
violate the constitutional identity of the Basic Law if it created a mechanism which
would amount to an assumption of liability for decisions of third parties which entail
[budgetary] consequences that are difficult to calculate." Id at 102. In August 2017, the
German Constitutional Court mentioned the German constitutional identity in a
preliminary reference to Luxembourg on whether the legality of the European Central
Bank's public sector purchase program. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15 et al., Aug. 15, 2017,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDoes/Downloads/EN/2017/07/rs20170
718_2bvr085915en.pdf?_blob-publicationFile&v=1
[https://perma.cc/CCC3-SD76]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019). For the ECJ's response, see E.C.J. Case C-493/17, Weiss,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=8A44291A7920BE6F2DO
41528FB26AE18?text=&docid=208741&pagendex=0&doclang=en&mode=st&dir=&oc
c=first&part=1&cid=7848713 [https://perma.c/T3Y9-WLT5 (archived Oct. 27, 2019)
(holding that the challenged program is compatible with EU law).
283. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2735/14,
Dec.
15,
2015,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2015/12/rs20151
215_2bvr273514en.pdf?_blob-publicationFile&v=4
[https://perma.cc/B56H-MWSR]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019).
284. BVerfG,
1
BvF
1/05,
¶
47,
Mar.
13,
2007,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDos/Entscheidungen/EN/2007/03/fs2
0070313_1bvf000105en.html [https://perma.cc/LUY6-ZAUS) (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
285. For analysis, see Julian Nowag, EU Law, ConstitutionalIdentity, and Human
Dignity: A Toxic Mix?, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1441, 1450-51 (2017) (noting that the
German Constitutional Court has required human dignity compliance under national
law, "no matter in what way EU law develops").
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2 86
The
review has become a model for other constitutional courts.

doctrine has traveled from the United Kingdom, where the Supreme
Court held that incorporation into national law of EU legislation
cannot be intended to abrogate rule of law principles in the constitution
or common law, 2 87 to France, where the Conseil constitutionnel held
that transposition of EU legislation should not violate a rule or
28 8
principle that was inherent in the constitutional identity of France.
Even the Constitutional Court of Belgium, which has been one of the
most obedient apex courts, has found constitutional identity
irresistible. 289 Moving toward the new member states, the Slovak
Constitutional Court held that the Constitutional Court has the power

286. Kriszta Kovacs, The Rise of an Ethnocultural ConstitutionalIdentity in the
Jurisprudenceof the East Central European Courts, 18 GERMAN L.J. 1703, 1705 (2017)
("[T]he German Federal Constitutional Court served as a role model for V4 [the Visegrid
Group: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia] courts to empower
themselves to exercise identity review"). See also Agoston Mohay & Norbert T6th,
Decision 22/2016. (XI. 5.) AB on the Interpretationof Article E)(2) of the Fundamental
Law, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 468, 472 (2017) (arguing that "[i]t is particularly interesting to
note that, in reaching its decision, the [Hungarian] Constitutional Court expressly
referred to and summarized the most relevant case law of other EU member states'
constitutional courts, thus emphasizing the importance of judicial dialogue between
those courts themselves and with the CJEU. In this connection, it seems that the
Constitutional Court views the German Federal Constitutional Court (the
Bundesverfassungsgericht) as its greatest influence. In and of itself, that is not
problematic, but the Court's approach appears somewhat oversimplified (a 'cut-andpaste' affair) that failed to provide a deeper dogmatic analysis of why the Hungarian and
German constitutional systems do or should share the same constitutional core or follow
the same avenues of control"). It is equally interesting, however, how the German
Constitutional Court itself relied on foreign law to establish the legitimacy of its identity
30,
2009,
2
BvE
2/08,
1
47,
June
jurisprudence.
See
BVerfG,
2 0 09
/0 6 /es2
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/
0090630_2bve000208en.html [https://perma.cc/FVE5-JU33] (archived Oct. 26, 2019)
(enumerating a half dozen jurisdictions that share the Federal Constitutional Court's
view that the precedence (of application) of European Union law does not apply
unrestrictedly, but that it is restricted by national (constitutional) law and specifically
by provisions such as "constitutional identity and to limit the transfer of sovereign
powers to the European Union").
287. See R v. Sec'y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3, [111] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (advancing the argument that a Court of Justice order should not be construed in
a way that questions "the identity of the national constitutional order").
288. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006540DC, July 27, 2006, J.O. du 3 aont 2006, 11541 (Fr.) ('The transposition of a Directive
cannot run counter to a rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of France,
except when the constituting power consents thereto."); Conseil constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Council] decision No. 2011-631DC, June 9, 2011, J.O. du 17 juin 2011,
10306 (Fr.) (refusing to review a domestic law's compatibility with EU directives).
289. Philippe Gerard & Willem Verrijdt, Belgian Constitutional Court Adopts
National Identity Discourse, 13 EuR. CoNST. L. REV. 182, 186-88 (2017) (analyzing the
Belgian Constitutional Court's non-binding opinion that it has the power to review
legislatively approved treaties or the implementation of those treaties to ensure they
comport with the Belgian constitution).
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to review EU law in order to protect Slovak constitutional identity 29 0
and the Croatian legal establishment is similarly seized with these
identity matters. 29 1
Particularly revealing is the Taricco case of the Italian

Constitutional Court. 292 In that case, the Italian court, which has a
long history of tensions with the ECJ, 293 used the concept of identity
for the first time. At issue in this case was the application of the ECJ's
previous preliminary reference, demanding that Italian judges
disapply national statutes of limitations rules that would undercut
domestic prosecution of tax crimes against the EU. 294 Specifically, the
question was whether the ECJ's answer must be applied even when
the effect of its application would undermine the-principle of legality
in criminal law, which is a fundamental principle of the Italian
Constitution. 29 5 The ECJ took issue with the doctrinal premise of the
question, and pointed out that the application of the principle of
legality in this case would not clash with the principle of retroactivity
in criminal law, because legality does not apply to a procedural matter,

such as the statute of limitations. 296 When the case returned to the

Italian Constitutional Court, the court relied on the concept of identity
although not quite in the manner that the constitutional nationalists
would have liked. 297 The court
drew
connections between
constitutional identity and constitutional traditions and pointed out

290. Istavny snd Slovenskej rupubliky [Constitutional Court of Slovakia] Apr. 6,
2011, Decision No. II. US 501/2010.
291. See Branko Smerdel, In Quest of a Doctrine: CroatianConstitutionalIdentity
in the European Union, 64 ZBORNrK PFZ 513, 518 (2014) (asserting the importance of a
national constitutional identity in the context of EU integration).
292. See Order, Nov. 23, 2016, n.24, G.U. Feb. 1, 2017 (It.) (declaring that the
ECJ's rule in Tarrico violated the Italian Constitution's prohibition on retroactive
application of criminal statutes).
293. In Frontini, the Italian Constitutional Court held that the EU must respect
the "fundamental principles of our constitutional order." Corte Costituzionale (Corte
Cost.) (Constitutional Court), 27 Dicembre 1973, n.183, Foro it. 1974, I, 97, 314-29,
translatedin 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 372 (1974); see Corte Cost., 8 giugno 1984, n.170,
29 Giur. Cost. I 1098, translated in 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 756, 762-63 (1984)
(acknowledging the supremacy of European Community rules with direct effect over
national legislation).
294. See
Case
C-105/14,
Taricco
&
Others,
2015
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfdocid=164056&mode=req&pagelnd
ex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=7561101
[https://perma.cc/Z3T8-LVBB] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (requiring Italian courts to
disapply criminal law provisions when certain conditions are met).
295. Art. 25 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("No case may be removed from the court
seized with it as established by law. No punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of
a law in force at the time the offence was committed. No restriction may be placed on a
person's liberty save for as provided by law.").
296. For analysis, see Fabbrini & Pollicino, supra note 11, at 11-14 (discussing the
procedural history of the Taricco case).
297. See Order, Nov. 23, 2016, n.24, G.U. Feb. 1, 2017 (It.) (emphasizing the
importance of both national and European constitutional traditions).
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298
This
the pluralism inherent in the constitutional traditions.
indicates an avenue open in Europe, although not so much in the
United States, where discretion in the interpretation of identity is
299
limited by the appeal to tradition.
If national constitutional identity is not tied to a concept such as
tradition, the task of judicial definition is even more fraught with risk.
Constitutional courts have often struggled to answer this question
without losing face. The elements that national courts have subsumed
under the rubric of identity are oftentimes banal and common. They
include elements such as the "basic values and principles [of the
301
or "the essential
constitution]," 3 0 0 "inalienable human rights,"
302
Somewhat less
law."
of
rule
the
or
democracy
of
attributes
303
the
certainty,
of
the
principle
to
referred
have
courts
abstractly,
general principles of nondiscrimination, or even the obligation to give
reasons. 3 04 The difficulty, however, is that all these principles
characterize both the European and the municipal (all the municipal
legal orders 305 ), so that, to the extent that identity includes an element
of differentiation, that work could be done only at the interpretative
level. And, as it is often the case in law, interpretation becomes less a
matter of substance than structure-specifically, a claim over which n

specific interpretation has allocated the power to issue authoritative -.3 06
This is v
statements about the meaning of a particular principle.

30 7
interpretation as turf.

298. See id. (asserting that Member States may adopt a particular understanding
of European constitutional traditions).
299. For an early argument in favor of connecting identity with tradition, see
Wojciech Sadurski, European Constitutional Identity? 7-21 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working
Paper No. 33, 2006).
300. See S.T.C., Dec. 13, 2004 (B.O.E., No. 3, 5) (Spain) (declaring that some
provisions of the Constitution of Spain place limits on the applicability of European law).
301. See Fabbrini & Pollicino, supra note 11, at 3 ("Italy epitomizes the case of a
founding EU member state where the supreme institutional actors have never
systematically identified a core set of fundamental elements or values functionally
designed to protect the identity of the polity against supranational interference.").
302. See Nalez Ustavniho soudu ze dne 03.05.2006 (US) [Judgment of the
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006], sp.zn Pl. US 66/04.
303. Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1437 (analyzing the language used by
constitutional courts when identifying constitutional limits to EU laws).
304. Id.
305. Kumm, supra note 53, at 120 ("the universality of an ideal does not make it
formally inadequate as an ideal central to the identity of a particular community").
306. See Vlad Perju, SupranationalStates in the PostnationalConstellation, INT'L
J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2019).
307. What stands out is how in deciding these cases, the national courts do not
send preliminary references to Luxembourg. See supra Part W.A. For a similar
observation, see Mohay & T6th, supra note 286, at 473 (noting, with regard to the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, that the court did not even consider requesting a
preliminary ruling from the CJEU).
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The examples above show that judicial discretion has been
particularly difficult to contain when courts have sought to fill out the
meaning of identity proactively. But when confronted with specific

cases, discretion

has been

somewhat contained by the factual

circumstances of specific cases. The UK Supreme Court, for instance,
has held that the EU lacks the power to make decisions about British

citizenship, which is part of the national constitutional identity

308

While, at least initially, the German Constitutional Court sought to
keep ultra vires separate from identity, other courts have been less
rigorous. In the Czech Republic, in 2012, the Constitutional Court

assumed jurisdiction to review a decision of the ECJ applying EU
legislation on the harmonization of pension systems among national
legal systems, and holding that social security benefits of Czech
retirees should include the period they worked in Czechoslovakia prior
to that country's dissolution in 1992. The Czech judges held that the

ECJ exceeded the EU's competencies to regulate solely cross-border
situations and should therefore be inapplicable within the jurisdiction
of the Czech Republic.3 0 9 By holding the ECJ's decision ultra vires, the
Czech constitutional judges acted in violation of foundational doctrines
of European constitutionalism that give the ECJ the final word over
the interpretation of the EU law, including on jurisdictional
matters. 310 As in Germany, the Czech court subsumed the ultra vires
ground, and therefore was immunized to identity review. 31 1
3. Identity and Nationalism
The history of European constitutional identity includes many
instances where national legal orders set the theoretical grounds for
resisting the claims of European federalism but did not follow through
in practice. The German Constitutional Court, which assumed a
leadership role in opposing European integration, never rendered a
piece of European legislation without effect either on the human rights
or the limited conferral grounds.3 12 Identity seems eminently

308. See Pham v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2015] UKSC 19, [58], [821,
[90]-[911 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that ultimately domestic courts determine
the jurisdictional limits of European treaties).
309. Nalez Ustavniho soudu ze dne 31.01.2012 (US) [Judgment of the
Constitutional Court of Jan. 31, 2012], sp.zn Pl. US 5/12.
310. For a discussion, see Jan Komarek, Case Note, Playing with Matches: the
Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra
Vires; Judgment of January31, 2012, Pl. US 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII, 8 EUR. CONST.
L. REV. 323, 328-34 (2012) (explaining why the Constitutional Court's decision was
"plainly wrong" and giving context for the decision).
311. Nilez Ostavniho soudu ze dne 03.05.2006 (US) [Judgment of the
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006], sp.zn Pl. U1S 66/04.
312. Between 1974 (Solange I) and 1986 (Solange II), the German Constitutional
Court did not exercise the prerogative it claimed for itself to deprive of effect EU
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positioned to change that dynamic by emboldening national courts to
follow through with their threats.
Some instances are worrisome but largely benign. The case of the

Czech Constitutional Court decision in the Landtovd case discussed
313
Another example, if somewhat more
above is one such example.
concerning, is the 2016 Ajos decision of the Danish Constitutional
Court. 314 In that case, the Danish judges refused to apply the EU
principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of age to a dispute between
private parties. 3 15 The Danish judges explained that such application
lacked explicit grounding in the EU Treaty, that it was the creation of
the ECJ and that, if applied in the case at hand, it would violate the
terms of Denmark's accession to the EU and lead the Danish
3 16
Constitutional Court to overstep its own jurisdictional boundaries.

While the ECJ's far-reaching case law on the general principle of
nondiscrimination on the basis of age into domestic law had given rise
to many controversies, the Danish court went one big step further
when it declined to fulfill its duties under EU law. 317 While the Danish
court did not use explicitly the concept of identity, identity's radiating
effect informs the legal analysis. Identity is the genus proximus for the W
principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate
of
principle
the
with
here
contrast
which
expectations,
3 18
This debate engages some of
nondiscrimination on the basis of age.
3 19
A case
the most central doctrines of European constitutionalism.
more difficult to classify comes from Romania. There, the Romanian
Constitutional Court held that its duties under the national
constitution rank higher than any obligation to protect judicial
independence and comply with other anticorruption safeguard
mechanisms upon which the supranational institution conditioned the
320
country's EU accession.

legislative acts that violated the fundamental rights provisions of the German Basic
Law. For a discussion, see Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 263-95.
313. Czech Constitutional Court, P1 U.S 66/04, May 3, 2006,
314. Danish Constitutional Court Case no. 15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for
Ajos A/S v. Estate of A (relating to European Court of Justice, Case C-441/14 Dansk
Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 45-51.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 9-10.
319. Rass Holdgaard, et al., From Cooperationto Collision: The ECJ's Ajos Ruling
and the Danish Supreme Court's Refusal to Comply, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (2018);
see also Urska Sadl & Sabine Mair, Mutual Disempowerment: Case C-441/14 Dansk
Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen and Case no.
15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for Ajos A/S v. The estate left by A, 13 EUR. CONST.
L. REV. 347 (2017).
320. Romanian Constitutional Court, Judgment nr. 104/2018, ¶¶ 88-90 and
Judgment nr. 137/2019, 1 77.
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When identity is combined with authoritarian populism, the

result is to take resistance to European integration to new levels. The
case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court stands out in this

context. 32 1 Litigation ensued over disagreements over Hungary's
reallocation of asylum seekers under EU Decision 2015/1601.322 The
government had failed to stop the application of the EU Decision by
way of a constitutional amendment that would have introduced in the

Hungarian Fundamental Law language to the effect that "[w]e hold
that the defense of our constitutional self-identity, which is rooted in
our historical constitution, is the fundamental responsibility of the
state." 32 3 The newly amended EU clause would have stipulated that
EU law "in harmony with the fundamental rights and freedoms
established in the Fundamental Law must not place restrictions on
Hungarian territory, its population, the state, or its inalienable
rights." 324 The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which had been
captured by Viktor Orbin's regime, used the constitutional doctrine of
identity to accomplish what the government could not accomplish
through political means. 325 The court held that accepting asylum

seekers into Hungary pursuant to the EU scheme would amount to a
violation of the constitutional self-identity of Hungary.3 2 6 That identity
was "a fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law-it is
merely acknowledged by the Fundamental Law." 327 The court held that
constitutional identity is rooted in Hungary's history and as such
cannot be dispensed with by way of international treaty. 32 8 The
decision is replete with the vestiges of nationalism, shot through with
references to mystic patriotism and Saint Stephen's Holy Crown as a
source of authority. 329 The constitution must be interpreted in the light

of the Preamble called the "National Avowal" and the "achievements of
the historical constitution," Article R(3). 330
Particularly relevant is the way in which the Hungarian
Constitutional Court reaches out to the German Constitutional Court

321. Alkotminybfr6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016,
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.).
322. EU Decision 2015/1601 (Sept 22, 2015).
323. Alkotmanybir6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016,
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.).
324. See Gabor Halmai, Abuse of Constitutional Identity: The Hungarian
ConstitutionalCourt on Interpretationof Article E) (2) of the FundamentalLaw, 43 REV.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 23 (2018).
325. Id.
326. For further analysis, see id.
327. Alkotmanybir6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016,
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.).
328. Id.
329. For a study, see Kovacs, supra note 285, at 1705.
330. Alkotmanybir6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016,
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.).
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for inspiration on how to use the concept of identity as a doctrinal tool
33
that integrates both human rights and ultra vires considerations.
The Hungarian judges held that it falls within its own scope of
competences, on the basis of a relevant petition, in exceptional cases
and as a resort of ultima ratio, i.e. along with paying respect to the
constitutional dialogue between the member states, it can examine
whether exercising competences on the basis of Article (E)(2) of the
Fundamental Law results in the violation of human dignity, the
essential content of any other fundamental right or the sovereignty
(including the extent of the competences transferred by the state) and
the constitutional self-identity of Hungary. While the court retains the
right to determine the content of constitutional identity on a case-by-

case basis, it did offer some guideposts: "freedoms, the division of
powers, republic as the form of government, respect of autonomies
under public law, the freedom of religion, exercising lawful authority,
parliamentarism, equality of rights, acknowledging judicial power, the
332
protection of nationalities that are living in Hungary."
At a general level, little about this statement sounds inherently

problematic. Yet, in its specific application, its wide range enables the
Hungarian judges to draw bright lines to European integration. Such

unilateral action would have the result of fragmenting European
federalism even under regular circumstance. But when the loss of the
court's judicial independence renders the court a mouthpiece for a
government engaged in the undoing of the rule of law and the
33 3
identity shows its dark effects.
Hungarian constitutional state,
Hungary is not the only jurisdiction where these effects are
already visible. In October 2018, the Court of Justice of the European
Union granted a consequential, if somewhat unusual, interim order at
the request of the European Commission acting as plaintiff in an

infringement action against Poland. 334 The ECJ ordered Poland to
reinstate with immediate effect judges of the Polish Supreme Court
who had been forced into early retirement by legislation overhauling
the Polish judiciary. 335 The European Commission alleged that the
legislative measures violate judicial independence as protected under
EU law and would produce harm that was irreparable if not corrected
without delay. 336 After some initial grumbling, the Polish authorities
implemented the ECJ's interim order, although concomitantly they
referred the matter to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, asking for

331. See Kovacs, supra note 286, at 1705.
332. Id.
333. See generally Kelemen, supra note 27, at 211; Pech & Scheppele, supra note
27, at 3.
334. Case C-619/18, R Commission v. Poland, Order of the Vice-President of the
Court, E.C.J. Oct. 19, 2018.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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clarification as to what effect, if any, an ultra vires act of the EU can
have in Poland. 337 The question was tongue in cheek. The Polish
Tribunal had previously held that national authorities are under no
duty to give effect to acts of EU institutions that -transgress the
delegation of national powers to the European level. 338 While "acts of
EU institutions" are typically construed to refer to secondary
legislation, acts of the ECJ, including orders and judgments, can also
be subject to review. 3 39 Thus, when national apex courts determine
that Luxembourg has transgressed its powers under the EU Treaty,
national judges will likely perform almost a reverse-Mangold340 review
and take the treaty's enforcement into their own hands.
The ECJ delivered its judgment in this case in June 2019.341 The
court held, without specifically engaging Poland's identity-based
arguments, that lowering the retirement age of the judges of the
Supreme Court of Poland and that "granting the President of the
Republic the discretion to extend the period of judicial activity of judges
of that court beyond the newly fixed retirement age, the Republic of
Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations" to respect judicial

independence.

34 2

This, however, may not be the end of the matter. A

decision on this matter of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is yet to
be delivered. 343 The Warsaw Trybunal Konstytucyjny may well choose
to reiterate existing precedent that the Polish Constitution enjoys
"precedence of binding force and precedence of application" 344 over EU

337. For analysis, see Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, From Constitutionalto Political
Justice: The Tragic Trajectoriesof the Polish ConstitutionalCourt, VERFBLOG (Feb. 27,
2019),
https://verfassungsblog.de/from-constitutional-to-political-justice-the-tragictrajectories-of-the-polish-constitutional-court/ [https://perma.cc/789X-S8UW] (archived
Jan. 13- 2020).
338. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) Nov. 24, 2010, Case no. K 32/09 (Treaty
of Lisbon).
339. Pursuant to this understanding, the Italian Corte costituzionale held recently
that Italian authorities are under no obligation to implement ECJ decision that conflict
with Italian constitutional identity. See Italian Constitutional Court Order No. 24, § 2
(2017),
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recentjudgments/
O_24_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A84Z-YKL5] (archived Dec. 3, 2019). For another recent
similar holding, see R v. Sec'y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding itself free not to implement decisions of the ECJ that go too far, and
continuing to apply national law).
340. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, E.C.J. Nov. 22, 2005. The Court of Justice
of the European Union held that, in the area of non-discrimination of the basis of age,
EU legislation codifies constitutional principles that already exist in the Member States.
The implication is that those national principles receive heightened protection from their
recognition at the supranational level, including by the ECJ. A reverse-Mangold
situation would place national courts in charge of enforcing supranational law.
341. Case C-619/18, E.C.J. June 24, 2019.
342. Id.
343. For a second recent decision of the ECJ, see A. K. & Others (Independence of
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C-585/18, C 624/18, C-625/18), Nov.
19, 2019.
344. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case 18/04, ¶ 11.
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law as well as the central role of the ultra vires doctrine in preserving
the ability of the "Republic of Poland to continue functioning as a
sovereign and democratic state."345 The Trybunal may also mention its
duty to protect the national constitutional identity of Poland
(tozsamosd konstytucyjna), 346 wherein democratic self-government,
translated as the ability of the Polish political community to govern

themselves through its freely chosen representatives enacting laws,
such as the judiciary reforms at issue here, reigns supreme. If, further,

the authority of EU law in the legal systems of its member states is
granted not pursuant to the Treaty itself but rather "by virtue of
German
the
as
empowerment," 34 7
constitutional
[national]
Constitutional Court held in the Lisbon decision, then the normative
interface between the supranational and national legal orders becomes
even harder to police from a supranational level.

V. THE FUTURE(S) OF IDENTITY FEDERALISM

This Part turns the attention to a few of the possible central
themes in the future of identity federalism. Subpart V.A. discusses
centralization as backlash to identity claims on behalf of subunits.

Subpart V.B. discusses the alignments of attachments outside of the
binary model of state (nation-state) and federal (supranational). It
looks to the formation of identity in the middle, in-between spaces.
Regionalism is one such example. Finally, subpart V.C. returns to the
specific claims of identity in the age of populism.
A. Centralization
Like all theories that seek to ground state sovereignty, identity
federalism sooner or later encounters attempts to curb the centrifugal
tendencies that it generates within a federal system. Each such system

has mechanisms of centralization ready to be activated in these
situations. The arc of American federalism, after the Civil War but
particularly post-New Deal, has included a broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, which, together with a strict enforcement of the

345. Id. 1 8.
346. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) Nov. 24, 2010, Case nr. K 32/09 (Treaty
of Lisbon). For a study, see Anna ledzinska-Simon & Michal Zi6lkowski, Constitutional
Identity of Poland: Is the Emperor Putting On the Old Clothes of Sovereignty?, in
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN A EUROPE OF MULTILEVEL CONSTITUTIONALISM 243

(Christian Calliess ed., 2019).
347. German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 123, 267 (348-349, 354, 397, 400, 402)
Lissabon (2009). Cf. English translation, supra n.8, §§ 240 ("the primacy . .. only applies
by virtue and in the context of the constitutional empowerment"), 331-32 ('primacy by
virtue of constitutional empowerment'), 334-35, 339, 343.
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supremacy clause and a rigorous interpretation of preemption
doctrines, have become the doctrinal mechanisms to support the
political, cultural, and social homogenization. It is true that some
doctrines have survived this process of nationalization, which justify

the leeway they afford to states by reference to their identity. One such
example is the "independent interpretation" doctrine, which concerns
the interpretation of provisions in a state constitution that mirror
those of the federal constitution. 34 8 According to this doctrine, while

state courts cannot violate federal law, they may decide to give state
constitutional provisions different meaning than the federal
constitution.3 49
The European experience proves the challenges of doctrinalizing

identity, especially at both the federal and subfederal levels. As shown,
the duty of the EU to protect the national (constitutional) identity of
its member states is specifically included in the Treaty of Lisbon. 350

The question then becomes what constitutes identity, and who gets to
answer that question. National constitutional courts have been hard at
work seeking to define, each for themselves, the meaning of their
identity. But while the efforts of national courts might have been
triggered by developments at the European level, many national

courts, as it has been shown, framed their efforts as one mandated by
their own national constitutions. As the German Constitutional Court
has spelled out, it is possible that the meaning of national identity
under the national constitution could fall outside of the boundaries of
what deserves protection as national constitutional identity at the
European level. 35 1 From the standpoint of the national constitution,
the list of identity might be considerably longer and the need for
identity protection further reaching. To take just one example from the
Germany context, the German Constitutional Court has held that
fiscal decisions are central to democratic self-government and that

their delegation to the supranational, European level, would violate
the identity of the German Constitution. 352 From the European

perspective, however, the Eurozone crisis has exposed the inherent
instability of a monetary union that is not backed up by a fiscal
union. 353 Political proposals to prop up the Eurozone have inevitably

348. Schapiro, supra note 4, at 393.
349. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-44 (1983). For analysis, see James A.
Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretationof State
Constitutions:A Case Study in ConstitutionalArgument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1221-24
(1998); Schapiro, supra note 4, at 393.
350. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(2), 2010 O.J. C
83/01 [hereinafter TEU].
351. See Claes & Reestman, supra note 28, at 938-41.
352. BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08; see supra Section III.B.1.
353. For a recent such argument, see Pierpaolo Barbieri & Shahin Vall6e, A Fiscal
Union for the Eurozone: The Only Way to Save the EU, FOREIGN AFF. MAG. (Sept. 26,
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included the creation of a common budgetary mechanism that would
amount to a fiscal union. 354 Would such reforms, which are arguably
indispensable to the future of the European Union, violate Germany's
national constitutional identity? Could Germany invoke that
constitutional identity in order to prevent their application, and would
such invocation be deemed compatible with the demands of European
constitutionalism? The German court made the implications of
constitutional identity explicit in its first-ever preliminary reference on
whether the European Central Bank could lawfully purchase bonds
355
through special mechanisms put in place during the Eurozone crisis.
The outcome of this clash of identity versus identity remains
unknown because the ECJ's approach to defining the meaning of
national identity at the European level has thus far been cautious and

pragmatic. Thus far, the ECJ held that national constitutional identity
can be used to justify the limitation on free movement stemming from

the prohibition of last names that retain nobility titles. 356 The ECJ has
357
holding that a
upheld a national interpretation of human dignity;
national language constitutes "a constitutional asset which preserves
3 61
But it is far from apparent
diversity; 360 and protection of minors.

s

what exactly the concept of constitutional identity does in these cases.

.

359
media
the nation's identity"; 358 freedom of assembly and expression;

Here, EU law defers to national law in grounds for reasons that are.
cultural. But if that is sufficient to bring them within the purview of
the national identity, then this clause is so broad that it includes
virtually everything. Unsurprisingly, it has been argued that

2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-09-26/fiscal-union-eurozone
[https://perma.cc/W4AP-9H7J] (archived Dec. 3, 2019).
354. Id.
355. BverfG 2 BvR 2728/13 et al, order of 7 February 2014. The German court
included in the preliminary reference language to the effect that it - Karlsruhe- has the
right to decide whether the OMT decision "could violate the constitutional identity of the
Basic Law if it created a mechanism which would amount to an assumption of liability
for decisions of third parties which entail [budgetary] consequences that are difficult to
calculate." Id. § 102. In August 2017, the German Constitutional Court mentioned the
German constitutional identity in a preliminary reference to Luxembourg on whether
the legality of the European Central Bank's public sector purchase program. BverfG 2
BvR 859/15 et al, order of 15 August 2017. For the ECJ's response, see Case C-493/17,
Weiss (holding that the challenged program is compatible with EU law).
356. Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien,
2010 E.C.R. I-13693.
357. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberbirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609.
358. Case C-391/09, Malgozata Runevi-Vardyn and Lukasz Pawel Wardyn v.
Vilniaus miesto savivaldybes administracija and Others, 2011 E.C.R. I-3787.
359. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-5659.
360. Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs
GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3689.
361. Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, 2008

E.C.R. I-00505.
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constitutional identity is the new label for the court's longtime
jurisprudence of limitations on the fundamental
freedom of
movement. 3 62 Moreover, very few decisions of the ECJ require EU
institutions to take into consideration the national identity of its

member states. 36 3 In no case does Article 4(2) by itself constitute
sufficient ground for the holding. The ECJ has rejected pleas to

recognize that respect for national identity has been part of European
constitutionalism from the beginning of European integration. 364
There are, of course, cases of exceptions from the fundamental
freedoms, but it is hard to see how they can be interpreted as
"constitutional identity" cases. Moreover, and importantly, the ECJ
has refused to tweak its supremacy jurisprudence to accommodate a
constitutional identity clause.36 5
But, and importantly, the ECJ offers authentic interpretations of
the EU Treaty. It can, in that capacity, control the effect of national
identity by imposing a unitary meaning. This area seems ideally suited

for the ECJ to claim, as it so often does, that the effectiveness of EU
law would be eroded if member states could invoke their identity in
order to apply EU law selectively. This need not deny member states
of any powers in this area, but it simply circumscribes their
interpretations to a range of acceptable meanings. 366
It helps to recall in this context that the concept of constitutional
identity does not enter the universe of European constitutionalism in
a vacuum. Rather, it enters at a particular moment in time and within
a framework that has been developing for over half a century. The
identity provision becomes part of EU law, at least in this form, at the
moment when it is least likely to have much of an effect. Not quite the

extraordinary tool that its advocates see in it, identity receives this

362. Konstadinides, supra note 268.
363. Case C-300/11, ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2013
E.C.R. (holding that Art. 4(2) TEU and Art. 346(1) TEU hold that national security
remains the sole responsibility of Member States).
364. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust
2005 E.C.R. I-2077; Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-213/07, Michaniki
2008 E.C.R. 1-10999, ¶ 31.
365. Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v. Burgermeisterin der Stadt
Bergheim, 2010 E.C.R. I-08015. Along similar lines, in Case C-515/08 Palhota, AG
Villalon argued that values listed in Art. 9 TFEU (high level of employment, adequate
social protection, high level of education) are ground for greater discretion to Member
States. For discussion, see Sinisa Rodin, National Identity and Market Freedoms after
the Treaty of Lisbon, 7 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y 11, 16 (2011) (interpreting AG
Villalon's position to mean that "a high level of social protection constitutes part of the
national identity of Member States and justifies a departure from market freedoms.").
The Court did not follow the AG's recommendations. For a similar dynamic, in the
procedural context, see Case C-173/09, Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v. Natsionalna
zdravnoosiguritelna kasa, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08889.
366. This path would bring the ECJ into tension with the OMT decision of the
German Constitutional Court. See Claes & Reestman, supra note 28.
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more robust formulation at the time when-and, to some extent,
precisely because-it can be easily neutralized using existing
European doctrines.3 6 7 First, its reach is restricted by the existence of
other provisions, such as mainly Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union.3 6 8 While the abstract text of neither provision interprets itself,
it seems quite straightforward that the several interpretations will
have to meet a certain threshold of normative coherence. It is hard to
believe that a regime such as Hungary's, for instance, will be allowed
to invoke national identity in order to protect itself from European
scrutiny. Emphasis here is on the verb "allow" since the Hungarian
government will certainly seek to invoke Article 4(2).
A second related reason why the identity provision need not
amount to a limitation of supremacy is that, by inclusion into the
treaty, the concept of identity becomes a concept of EU law. The
implication is that the court, in its "pre-eminent position of the ECJ as
36 9
can control its effect by
the ultimate interpreter of this legal order,"
centralizing its meaning. The ECJ has used this technique previously
throughout its jurisprudence, for instance when defining the meaning

3 71
The,!
of concepts such as the meaning of "worker"370 or "disability."

European judges might be particularly inclined to harmonize the
meaning of constitutional identity given the lessons of what the ultra G
vires tool has done in the hands of disobedient national courts. But %s
even as they try to do that, and the same would be true in the case of

American federalism, they themselves would be forced to use the
category of identity. The tendency to shape conflict between different
levels of jurisdiction as identity versus identity is specific to what is
referred to above as the vortex that identity produces within a legal
system.

B. Regionalism
The above discussion has assumed the existence of a binary of
states within a federal system, whether that system is of a traditional
kind such as the United States or of an arguably sui generis kind such

as the European Union. Yet, for all the complexities that we have
372
it seems both
identified in relation to the formation of identity,
contrived and inaccurate to assume that identity lines up neatly within
these two levels of government. In fact, identities might defy those

367. I discuss this possible solution in Perju, On the (De-)Fragmentation of
Statehood in Europe, supra note 163, at 432-34.
368. Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1430.
369. Id.
370. Case 53/81, D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. I-01035.
371. E.C.J. Case C-13/05, Chac6n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, 2006 E.C.R.
I-6467.
372. See supra Part I.A.
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preexistent structures and cluster instead in the in-between spaces.
Moving to theorize these developments, scholars of American
federalism have focused on "the region as a subnational area
encompassing all or part of multiple states" and thus "depart[ing] from

established state and federal jurisdictional lines to form a supra state
yet subnational area." 373 It is in these in-between spaces that much of
the politics is focused, whether in the area of immigration,
environmental regulations, or education. 3 74
While regions have a pronounced territorial aspect, a focus on
identity makes it possible to entertain a deterritorialized network of
interests. When states sue the federal government in order to enjoin
action or to prevent it, they are creating a network that occupies a
space their action creates between the states and the national
government. Sometimes that space does have a more pronounced
regional aspect, as is the case when states along the southern border
seek to put pressure on the federal government's immigration
policies. 375 But in other cases, most prominently environmental cases,
identity creates regions of common interest that do not have a
territorial representation. 376 This complicates the neat picture of the
overlap between structure and interests.
This issue is also present in the European context. Scholars of
European integration have explored if the EU can be understood as a
number of different unions, rather than one, all-encompassing
organization. 37 7 The constitutive treaties are full of opt outs and
particular derogations. More importantly, the treaty itself permits
member states to engage in "enhanced cooperation," that is, to
establish and pursue initiatives only within a subset of all the EU
members. 378 The Eurozone is one such example, as is the Schengen
visa-free area. The treaty rules require only that, in addition to not
violating the general principles of the EU, such smaller unions be open
under equal conditions to other states that might later decide to join. 3 79

373. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 377, 383 (2017).
374. Id. at 381-82 ("Regionalism has long been associated with state resistance to
the federal government, but it has also been a potent tool of federal bureaucracy. If
regional coordination has sometimes enabled states to compete with, or to repel the
expansion of, federal administration, the federal government's own reliance on regional
accommodation and organization has facilitated its entry into new policymaking space.
.. .When considering the critical influence of regionalism on Our Federalism, then,
regions cannot be placed on either the state or the federal side of the balance.").
375. See Briefs for Amici Curiae, Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
376. See, e.g., Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6.
377. See, e.g., Richard Bellamy & Sandra Kr6ger, Differentiated Integrationas a
Fair Scheme of Cooperation (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Adv. Stud., Working Paper No.
2019/27, 2019).
378. See TFEU Arts. 326-34. For analysis, see PIRIS, supra note 33, at 98.
379. See TEU Art. 20(1) ("Such cooperation shall be open at any time to all Member
States, in accordance with Article 328 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.").
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Conditions for access, such as stringent economic criteria in the case of
the Eurozone or a reliable immigration enforcement mechanism for the
Schengen area, are, at least in theory, not discriminatory. Many see
this variable geometry in Europe, or an EU with different speeds, as
the necessary future for a continent that grew from its original six to
its current twenty-eight members, among which there are vast
differences. Current proposals for reform consider strengthening the

"core" Eurozone states through the creation of a common parliament,

380
EU
a fiscal union, and other such measures of deeper integration.
member states that are not in the Eurozone generally oppose this
model of European integration for fear that it might put them in a
second-class category. 381 Identity is sometimes invoked in these
debates, with the argument being that the institutional structure
should reflect the unitary, as opposed to the fragmented, nature of the
382
Whatever specific form these
European identity of member states.
mini unions might take, they occupy a space in between the nationstates and the supranational institutions. Identity will play a

somewhat different, though equally impactful role, in these debates.
C. Populism
Identity federalism seems tailor-made for the age of populism. As
already seen, the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian courts rely on that
concept in order to articulate their opposition to the project of
European unification. In these jurisdictions, identity has empowered
autocratic populists to use as they wish the authority that 7
constitutional pluralism as a theory of European constitutionalism
recognizes as theirs. 383 While these jurisdictions are notable for their '.

radicalism, identity poses a broader and, at times, subtle challenge to-.al
liberal constitutionalism in the age of populism. The refugee crisis in
Europe and the immigration debate in the United States have shaped

380.

See, e.g., EUR. COMM'N, SCENARIO 3 OF THE WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF

EUROPE: THOSE WHO WANT MORE Do MORE (2018); see also Eurozone Budgetary
https://www.euractiv.com/wp2019),
21,
(Feb.
Proposal
Instrument
content/uploads/sites/2/2019/02/French-German-Contribution-on-a-EurozoneBudgetary-Instrument-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9EB-K4B9] (archived Jan. 13, 2020).
381. See Marcin Goclowski & Marcin Goettig, Polishpresident says 'multi-speed'
5,
2017,
of
bloc,
REUTERS,
Sept.
will
lead
to
break-up
EU
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-eu-duda/polish-president-says-multi-speed[https://perma.cc/G3XD-J9SF]
eu-will-lead-to-break-up-of-bloc-idUSKCN1BG2AJ
(archived Jan. 13, 2020).
382. These arguments were particularly forceful in the context of EU expansion.
See, e.g., SENEM AYDIN-DUZGIT, CONSTRUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY (Palgrave

2012).
383. For an illuminating study, see R. Daniel Kelemen & Laurent Pech, Why
Autocrats Love Constitutional Identity and Constitutional Pluralism: Lessons from
Hungary and Poland 6 (Reconnect Eur., Working Paper No. 2, 2018).
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the landscape of contemporary politics. 384 From "le grand ddbat sur
l'identitd nationale"in France to the Muslim ban in the United States,
and from the British-ness debate in the Brexit context to the search for
the Dutch or Belgian national identity, the discursive category of
identity has become central to political discourse.3 8 5
Central features of identity make it appealing, available, and
dangerous in this charged political context. As Jan-Werner Muller has
argued, populism feeds on the problems of political representation to
moralize a discourse of antipluralism that is quintessentially opposed
to the values of openness of liberal democracy. 386 The leader claims to
represent the people, identified as unity of purpose and meaning. It is
easy to see how this particular understanding of the nature of the
political community can use a conception of identity. As recent political
experiences from Hungary to Venezuela and from Turkey to the United
States show, the identitarian discourse enables populist leaders to

claim access to the essence of a political community and to claim
legitimacy for political projects that are oftentimes both sectarian and
divisive. At a time of ever-deeper political polarization, under the
pressures of an information economy that continues to elude state
regulation and control, the effect of identity in political discourse can
be far-reaching.
It is still too early to determine the exact scope and depth of the
challenge that poses to liberal constitutionalism.3 8 7 The effects of the
upheavals that have gripped politics in the United States and have
added even greater complexity to Europe's processes of "self-

constituting"3 8 8 are still difficult to determine. Identity may outlast
populism, should the latter start to fade. Or, perhaps a more likely
alternative, identity might become a mechanism for fragmentation of
a world that only recently seemed bound towards greater convergence.

VI. CONCLUSION

To paraphrase Kafka, identity is a cage in search of a bird.3 89
However glitzy or otherwise appealing it might seem at first blush,

384. For a study of the United States, see generally ARLIE HoCHSCHILD,
STRANGERS IN THEIR OwN LAND (2016). For a study of Europe, see generally IVAN
KRASTEV, AFTER EUROPE (2017).
385. Faraguna, ConstitutionalIdentity in the EU - A Shield or a Sword?, supra
note 10, at 1621 (identifying in these debates "a new trend", rather than isolated
manifestations of nostalgic feelings).
386.

JAN-WERNER MOLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (Univ. of Pa. Press 2016).
See, e.g., DAVID RUNCIMAN, How DEMOCRACY ENDS (2018); AZIZ HUQ AND
TOM GINSBURG, How TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2018).

387.
388.

Philip Allott, Epilogue: Europe and the Dream of Reason, in EUROPEAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supranote 35, at 202.

389.

FRANZ KAFKA, APHORISMS 16 (Schocken Kafka Library, 2015).
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that cage is still a cage. This Article has pointed to the darker side of
identity federalism. If recent upheavals in American politics and law
suggest that some fundamental rearrangements might be in the offing,
then federalism will be part of any project of rethinking American
constitutionalism. For all the significant differences between the two

legal systems, the EU experience serves as a cautionary tale for placing
federalism under the spell of identity. Resisting such a development,
while not easy given the politics and culture of our time, might be just

what fidelity to the values of constitutionalism-in Europe, the United
States or elsewhere-requires.
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